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ABSTRACT

Fear Itself: Assessing the Risks of Transporting High Level Nuclear Waste
by
Fred C. Dilger
Dr. Jerry Simich, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis contrasts and compares two approaches to risk assessment as they
apply to the problem o f transporting high level radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain,
NV. Risk assessment, a lineal descendant o f cost-benefit analysis, is an increasingly
popular tool for justifying policy or programmatic decisions that involve some potential
for public harm. The study uses Frank Fischer's framework for policy analysis to
examine the problem o f transportation risk assessment and to propose a new process for
risk assessment that has political legitimacy, rather than technical elegance, as its goal.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study will compare and contrast two alternative approaches to risk analysis
as they apply to transporting spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants in the US to a
proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. These two approaches are referred to as
'expert’ and ‘democratic.’ Expert risk assessment defines risk by comparing the activity
being assessed to the probability of death. This definition o f risk has rendered expert risk
largely ineffective as a policy tool. Democratic risk assessment argues that risk is
actually a culturally constructed phenomenon and democratic risk assessors argue that the
definition o f risk used by expert risk assessors is too narrow. This study argues that both
sides of the debate are incorrect and will propose a different approach. This approach
relies on the public to both answer key methodological questions and to provide a more
legitimate basis for making policy.
This chapter will provide information about the problem of transporting the waste
from nuclear power plants across the coimtry to the proposed storage site at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada. It will also describe the legal and regulatory framework within which
nuclear waste transportation takes place. The chapter will then introduce the competing
1
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approaches to risk assessment and describe how these approaches will be analyzed using
the framework for policy analysis developed by Frank Fischer.'
In Chapters 2 and 3 expert and democratic risk assessment will be examined byapplying each approach to the problem o f comparing routes for high level waste. Chapter
2 will examine the expert view o f risk. Chapter 3 will deal with democratic risk
assessment. Both chapters will conclude by applying Fischer’s policy framework. This
framework highlights the shortcomings o f both approaches to risk assessment. It will
also demonstrate that the competing frameworks miss a crucial aspect o f risk.
In Chapter 4, the experience o f transportation planners will be harnessed to serve
as the basis for a new process of risk assessment. This process relies on a combination of
political and deductive reasoning to define risk. This alternative method focuses on
public acceptability rather than on technical efficiency. The new process derives from the
central argument o f this study which is that risk should be defined and presented in a way
that incorporates the concems o f the affected public and is useful to governmental
decision makers. The current approaches to risk assessment are tuned to the concems o f
experts.

Background
The U.S. produces 20% o f its electricity using 119 nuclear power plants.
Commercial nuclear energy in the United States is generated primarily by light water
fission reactors. The reactors generate steam by using highly radioactive fuel rods

1 Frank Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1995), 1-24.
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containing U-235 in a reactor pile. The fuel rods are "enriched " by processing mined
uranium (which is typically about .07% U-235) to a level suitable for use in a reactor
(about 3% U-235). See Figure 1-1 for a depiction of a fuel rod assembly."

Nuclear Fuel Assembly

Nuclear
Fuel Pellet

Figure 1-1 Nuclear Fuel Rod Assembly

Operation o f the reactor depletes the amount of fissionable uranium in the fuel rod.
A typical fuel rod will become depleted after three years, and an average reactor will
generate approximately 30 tons of spent fuel rods each year. After the fuel rods are no
longer usable, they are stored in pools o f barium-treated water at the reactor sites. The
resultant high-level radioactive waste may be the most lethal substance ever created.
Upon removal from the reactor, the fuel rods must be isolated from the environment for at

■League o f Women Voters, The Nuclear Waste Primer (New York: Lyons Books), 15.
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least 2.500 years. This is due to the level of radiation still present in the spent fuel rod. A
"spent" fuel rod still contains ninety percent of the radioactivity of the original rod.
The United States Department o f Energy (DOE). Office o f Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management is currently studying deep geological disposal as the sole method of
storing the nation's present and projected inventory of high level radioactive waste. The
only location being studied for suitability as a disposal site is Yucca Mountain, Nevada,
immediately adjacent to the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in southern Nevada. If Yucca
Mountain is chosen, the waste will be transported from 119 civilian nuclear reactors and a
number o f defense facilities, ninety percent o f these sites are east o f the Mississippi
River.^ If highway and rail routes were chosen under present regulation and practice,
repository bound shipments could traverse 43 states.
Selecting acceptable transportation routes for radioactive waste is vitally
important for the future o f nuclear power. The present safe transport of approximately
500,000 hazardous materials shipments in the United States each day shows that the
logistical difficulties of moving relatively low amounts of radioactive waste are not
insurmountable.^ However, the problem facing the United States' high level radioactive
waste disposal program is whether or not the public will allow the transportation to take
place despite this excellent safety record.

" Plarming Information Corporation, The Transportation o f Spent Nuclear Fuel and High
Level Waste (Denver; Planning Information Corp., 1996), 8.
^ Institute o f Transportation Engineers, Transportation Planning Handbook (W ash DC:
Institute o f Traffic Engineers, 1993), 32.
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At this point, DOE estimates that there will be a total o f 63.000 metric tons o f spent

nuclear fuel from all the reactors that will need disposal by 2 0 3 5 / Disposing the waste
has proven to be the most intractable problem ever faced by the nuclear industry, in part
because o f wide-ranging public opposition/ While this was the least anticipated
component o f the problem, it has combined with DOE's inability to build a permanent
repository to prevent any new nuclear power plant from being licensed in the United
States since 1979. Figure 1-2 depicts the location o f Yucca Mountain with respect to the
nation's civilian nuclear power plants.

■US Dept, o f Energy, International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Fact Book (Wash DC: USDOE,
1992), US 1-2.
* Alvin Weinberg, “Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy,” Science vol. 177 (July
1972): 27.
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Figure 1-2 Yucca Mountain and US Nuclear Power Plants

After decades of indecision by U.S. policy makers. President Carter decided in
1979 to pursue deep geologic storage as the only means of disposal for civilian spent
nuclear fuel and high level waste from defense and research activities. Subsequently,
responsibility for disposing of such waste was given to the DOE under the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982.'

When will the waste be shipped?
The current schedule calls for the repository to begin receiving spent fuel in 2015.
However, frequent delays and schedule slippages have plagued the radioactive waste
program and have caused the nuclear power utilities who currently own the waste to call
for an immediate solution. The proposed answer has been to designate the Nevada Test
Site (NTS) as an interim storage facility (ISF). This facility could be in operation as early
as 2004. DOE estimates that the repository transportation program will last between 10
and 30 years, thus exposing corridors to risk for a long period of time.®

How Will the Waste get to Yucca Mountain?
Transporting the radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain is one o f the least studied
aspects o f the entire waste disposal program. Transportation problems were not included
in the political calculus o f selecting a site. The Yucca Mountain site is remote and is not
served by any rail route. Constructing a new rail line is required if the rail transportation

^ D^pX. o iE n c x ^ , Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments (Wash DC: USDOE, 1994),
44-48.
®Ibid. 54.
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mode will be used to ship waste.
Rail
Ideally, most of the spent nuclear fuel would be transported by rail. This mode has
numerous advantages from the DOE's point o f view. For example, DOE's Multi-Purpose
Canister program (MPC) proposed containers that could hold between 30-50 fuel
assemblies on a single flatcar as compared to the two to three assemblies that may be held
in the largest truck container.’ As a result, rail transportation would require fewer
shipments. Fewer rail shipments would simplify the administrative problems o f security
and handling and be less costly than truck transportation.
Another important reason in favor of rail transportation is that there are fewer
potential legal complications. Rail transportation routes are on private right o f way. As a
result, there are very few owners with whom the DOE will have to coordinate.
Additionally, the railroads, as interstate carriers, are compelled to carry the waste or lose
the ability to transport goods between states. The railroads have repeatedly sued the DOE
to avoid carrying radioactive materials and have lost every case because of the
implications for restraining interstate c o m m e rc e .T h e map in Figure 1-3 depicts

’ William Lemeshewsky, “Market Driven Approach for Transportation Services”
Presentation to Transportation External Coordination Working Group, Las Vegas, NV,
28 Jan 1998.
Michelle Mattson, “Transportation o f Radioactive Materials in Our Backyards-A
State’s Perspective,” Journal o f Energy Law and Policy, vol. 9 (Summer 1988) : 54.
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potential rail routes used to ship the waste. “

n

1C

‘' Paul H. Wright and Norman J. Ashford, Transportation Engineerings (New York:
Wiley 1989), 50-51.
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Figure 1-3 Class I rail lines

The limited number o f rail routes available to transport the HLW is another reason
rail transportation is the most attractive mode for the DOE. Fewer routes make route
selection more difficult to interfere with because o f the limited options, but easier to
sabotage for the same reasons. Political considerations combine with geography to
suggest that the preferred mode for radioactive waste transportation is rail.
There are, however, drawbacks associated with transporting HLW by rail. The
lack o f rail access to Yucca Mountain could cost in excess of one billion dollars to
rectify. Constructing a rail line would also delay the commencement of storage by five
years '■ Another drawback is that the US rail system is rapidly dwindling both in its
quantity and quality.
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 enabled railroad companies to discard unprofitable
rail fines. As a result, the United States has decommissioned 50% o f its top quality rail
lines (Class 1) in the last 20 y e a r s . A t the origin o f the trip, rail access may not be
available for many nuclear reactors. There is no rail access at the destination end of the
trip. The Union Pacific Railroad owns the track between Los Angeles and Salt Lake
City, and has recently discontinued passenger service and may soon abandon the line
altogether.'^ The DOE could be forced to subsidize the operation o f several rail lines to

'■ Paul Standish, “Current Status of DOE’s Transportation Program,” interview by
author. Las Vegas, NV 28 Jan. 1997.
Wright, Transportation Engineering, 53.
Roger Gunn, “Amtrak Looks North,” Las Vegas Review Journal, April 10, 1997 p A4.
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keep them operational until the HLW shipments have been completed, a period o f thirty
years.
Highway
It is likely that the absence of rail lines to the Yucca Moimtain and the Nevada Test
Site will force most o f the waste to be transported from reactors to the final disposal site
by truck. Truck transportation is more flexible than rail transportation. That flexibility,
however, creates additional problems. Administrative problems, such as security and
control o f the waste, are more difficult with truck transportation than with rail
transportation. Truck shipping will be significantly more costly than rail.
Another difficulty is that transportation will take place on publicly-funded and
maintained roads and the issues of liability, emergency response, and routing are more
problematic than for rail with its private right of way. The following map depicts the
possible interstate truck routes to Yucca Mountain and the nuclear power plants.
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Figure 1- 4 Interstate truck routes to Yucca Mountain

Truck transportation becomes most problematic and difficult to control in the area
o f route selection. The availability o f alternative routes enables powerful, or more
articulate interests to route HLW away from themselves and toward other groups. Route
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selection decisions become equity decisions that will take place in a highly political and
litigious atmosphere.

Intermodal Transportation
Combining rail and highway transportation is the most likely solution. This
intermodal solution (or more precisely bimodal) provides some of the best of both modes.
A nuclear power reactor that had no rail access would ship waste to an intermodal transfer
facility where it would be placed on a rail car and shipped to another transfer facility near
Yucca Mountain. The waste container would be loaded onto a heavy haul vehicle that
would transport the waste to the disposal site at Yucca Mountain. This would avoid the
requirement to build a railway to Yucca Mountain.
The use o f container on flatcar (COFC) transportation is booming in the United
States and provides a relatively simple and flexible alternative for the DOE's
transportation program. However, despite the flexibility and ease of bimodal
transportation, there is a significant drawback. The operational costs o f an intermodal
shipping campaign from a workable intermodal transfer site to another such site at Yucca
Mountain is almost exactly the same as the cost o f building and maintaining a rail route
to the moimtain.'^ Any cost savings that have been projected as a result of an intermodal
shipping program are also illusory since high maintenance costs of a heavy haul road
would offset the difference in construction costs between an intermodal site and a rail

Paul Standish, “Current Status o f DOE’s Transportation Program,” interview by
author. Las Vegas, NV 28 Jan. 1997.
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spur.

Regulatory and Legal Framework
The Regulatory Environment o f Route Selection
Congress has recognized that transporting HLW is a serious national problem that
requires considerable attention. The legislation that has been enacted, however, has
raised as many questions as it has answered. The existing legal structure is an
interlocking web of agencies, laws and procedures that regulate the transportation of
radioactive waste. These regulations grew out o f the more immediate problem of
hazardous waste transportation.
Awareness of the problems posed by transporting hazardous materials is relatively
recent. The need to regulate hazardous waste transportation was not urgent as long as the
predominant mode of transportation was railway. Railroads own the land on which they
transport materials and so responsibility for any accident is very clearly defined. Rail
accidents are also enormously expensive and so railroad owners have much greater
incentives to reduce accident rates than do truck shippers who bear only a portion of the
cost o f an accident (a railroad owns the track damaged in an accident while a trucking
company pays only the cost o f his truck). A ffee-market insurance system is sufficient to
reimburse people affected by highway accidents.
The suburbanization o f the U. S. population was facilitated by the increasing
availability o f truck transportation as an alternative to transporting fi'eight by rail

16

Institute o f Traffic Engineers, Transportation Planning Handbook, 32.

Reproduced with permission ot the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This

15
change of freight travel mode enabled hazardous materials to move unimpeded on
highways that are publicly controlled. Areas once insulated from hazardous materials
shipments were now vulnerable. The increasing trend toward truck transportation was not
monitored by government agencies. A series of accidents focused attention on the issue.
As a result of this trend, the U.S. Congress decided that there was a compelling public
interest in regulating transportation of hazardous materials.
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act 1982 (HMTA)
Awareness of the problems posed by transporting hazardous materials is relatively
recent. The need to regulate hazardous waste transportation was not urgent as long as the
predominant mode o f transportation was rail. The HMTA provided the first
comprehensive treatment o f the issue and was a positive step in the management of the
nation's hazardous materials. The HMTA set the U.S. policy for selecting routes for
hazardous materials, including HLW. The routing standards are especially vital
because:'^
•
•
•
•
•

The federal rules preempt state or local rules when the miles are not stringent as
federal law
Route selection decisions were made without reference to the people affected.
Route selections were made without a rational basis.
Routing dangerous materials exposes certain portions o f population to greater risk
than others.
Route selections create competing socioeconomic interests and raise questions o f
equity and efficiency.
The huge amount o f hazardous wastes transported in the United States caused the

Congress to attempt to create uniform standards for hazardous waste package labeling.

Code o f Federal Regulations 49 Parts 171, 173 and 177. Final Rules. May 1988.
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routing controls, and other standards. The importance o f the HMTA is that the DOT is
the responsible party for selecting routes for the transportation o f HL W. It also
established the framework for making decisions about selecting routes.
Price-Anderson Act
Congress established the Atomic Energy Commission (ABC) in 1946. The
AEC was given authority over the development o f nuclear weapons and commercial
power. Convinced that nuclear power could be applied for peaceful purposes. Congress
passed the Commercialization o f Nuclear Power Act in 1954 to enable public utilities to
develop the technology for commercial use of nuclear power.'* Under this statue, the
AEC was permitted to issue licenses to ‘Transfer or receive in interstate commerce,
manufacture, acquire (or) possess byproduct materials, source materials or special nuclear
materials."
The Price-Anderson Act established a unique system o f private insurance and
public indemnity for nuclear accidents.” The system created by Price-Anderson provides
coverage for public liability related to nuclear materials during storage, transportation and
use. It purpose was to guarantee funds would be available in the event o f a serious
accident and to encourage private industry to participate in the development o f nuclear
energy by accepting some o f the liability risk in the public arena.

'* Gerald Jacob, Site Unseen, (Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 4-23.
” Omar Brown, “Insurance and Indemnity Coverage for Public Liability Associated with
Nuclear Materials in Transportation,” Forum American Bar Association (Summer 1982):
1326-1334.
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Price-Anderson has been reenacted twice and amended several times. The
governmental indemnity options of the Act were removed by the 1975 amendments.'"
The government is indemnified only for shipments made by non-profit educational
institutions, foreign reactors, and the Federal government and its contractors. The NRC
has the responsibility for administering the financial protection system and the indemnity
agreements. The Federal government self-insures nuclear materials risk. The indemnity
for nuclear reactors is up to 500 million dollars for each nuclear incident occurring in the
US and up to 100 million dollars for each occurrence outside the US.*'
Indemnity for transportation accidents is covered by the “omnibus” features of
the Price-Anderson insurance indemnity system. The Price-Anderson protections were
broadened in 1966 when Congress added provisions for an “extraordinary nuclear
occurrence (ENO).” When it has been determined that an ENO has occurred, state laws
are waived in order to consolidate cases in a single federal district court. This is intended
to speed up compensation for victims.
Price-Anderson has never been tested in a transportation context in court. It is
likely that the provisions in the act are adequate to provide limited indemnity protection
for privately transported HLW. Price-Anderson was a vital piece o f legislation for the
nuclear industry because it removed the financial indemnity of the nuclear generators and
left responsibility squarely on the shoulders o f the public. The consequences o f any

Ibid., 1329.
Ibid., 1331.
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accident will be paid out o f public funds.
Nuclear Waste Policy Act o f 1982
Discontent with HLW transportation lead several states to enact laws prohibiting
or restricting power plant construction or licensing. When some of these laws were
upheld in Court, the Congress recognized the need to create a comprehensive program for
HLW storage and disposal. When nuclear power was first adapted for commercial use, it
was assumed that an appropriate technological solution would be found to dispose the
waste. No agency or industry invested in waste disposal, not surprisingly no technology
was forthcoming. In the 1970's the Federal Government incrementally provided
monetary and regulatory assistance in an attempt to deal with the problem of nuclear
waste.” The 97th Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) in 1982 as an
attempt to finally solve the problem. This Act selected five sites for consideration as a
repository. None of the original five sites was located in or near optimal geology.
Despite claims to the contrary, a process that relied on geological conditions for initial
site selection was never implemented."'^ In 1987, legislation removed other sites from
consideration for disposal and settled on Yucca Mountain as the only site to be studied.
The decision to use Yucca Mountain resulted from a combination of

” Jacob, Site Unseen. 4-23.
Ibid., 22.
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bureaucratic and political pressures. As Seley indicated:’'*
Sometimes the location finally chosen fo r a new development or the site chosen fo r
the relocation o f an existing facility, comes out to be the site around which the least
protest can be generated by those to be displaced. Rather than being an optimal, a
rational, or even a satisfactory location decision, the decision is perhaps more the
rejection by elements powerful enough to enforce their decision that another location
must not be used: alternatively, the location decision may result in a choice against
which no strong argument can be raised since such elements either inarticulate or
command too little power to render their argument effective.
There was also a powerful bureaucratic incentive to study only Yucca Mountain.
For 40 years, the NTS. just 90 miles northwest o f Las Vegas, was the only place where
the United States tested nuclear weapons by detonating them. From 1951 to 1992,
approximately 1000 nuclear warheads were detonated at the NTS. To support this
testing, an uninhabited area the size o f the State of Connecticut (1375 miles) was set aside
for use as a testing ground.’^ Billions o f dollars o f improvements (e.g. roads, power lines,
and buildings) were built and scrupulously maintained. By the end o f the 1980s,
however, public pressure to stop nuclear testing was growing. Simultaneously, computer
modeling techniques were rendering full-scale tests unnecessary. It became obvious that
the NTS would need a new mission.

’■*John Seley, and Julian Wolpert, “Location and Equity.” Kasperson, Roger E. (ed.)
Equity Issues in Radioactive Waste Management (Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain:
Cambridge MA), 1983.
Paul Standish, “Current Status of DOE’s Transportation Program,” interview by
author. Las Vegas, NV 28 Jan. 1997.
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The NWPA created a comprehensive plan to collect transport, and dispose o f
HLW. The cornerstone o f the bill was a provision for the construction o f "away from
reactor storage." A site for the facility to house this waste was to be proposed by the
secretary o f the DOE within one year o f the bill's passage, and completion of the storage
site was projected for the mid 1980s.'"
Nuclear Waste Policy Act and Amendments 1987
By 1987, the multi-state repository site selection process had created severe
political pressure on DOE. The comprehensive process for site selection had proven to
be a failure. In January o f 1987, the DOE announced that no repository could be
completed before 2008 (the previously announced date was 1998).*’ These pressures
created an opportunity to amend NWPA.
The result was the NWPAA o f 1987. This statute brought about several changes in
the DOE program. Major chariges in the process were that only a single site was to be
characterized (Yucca Mountain), the State o f Nevada was given funds for oversight, three
new oversight organizations were created and the discretion o f DOE managers was
restricted.'*
The Legal Environment of Route Selection

Dept, of Energy, Nuclear Waste Policy Act as Amended^ 23.
’’Paul Standish, “Current Status o f DOE’s Transportation Program,” interview by author.
Las Vegas, NV 28 Jan. 1997.
2S

Dept, of Energy, Nuclear Waste Policy Act as Amended 44.
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The HMTA gives the Department o f Transportation (DOT) broad regulatory
power. Any state, local or tribal transportation regulation, code or ordinance that is
determined by DOT to be inconsistent with federal transportation law under provisions of
49 Code o f Federal Regulations may be preempted.” The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) advises DOT on packaging and safety standards. In 1979, to avoid
redimdancy, the NRC adopted some DOT regulations and currently assigns licenses to
shippers if they comply with DOT transportation regulations.^"
Several states have passed legislation to control the public dangers presented
by radioactive materials transportation. Some states have excluded certain types or
quantities o f these materials while others have adopted and supplemented the federal
regulations. These state laws are evaluated in the context o f federal regulations and
determine consistency with the federal regulations. State regulations have not fared well
in this process because courts have held that interstate commerce would be jeopardized
had they not supported the federal regulations.^' An additional concern is that the state
laws were specifically enacted to exclude nuclear materials. The courts did not want to
establish a precedent for laws regulating other materials.
Courts have made it possible for localities to receive preemptive exceptions which

Dept, o f Transportation, Guidelines fo r Selecting Preferred Highway Route Controlled
Quantity Shipment o f Radioactive Materials (Wash DC 1992): 5-8.
30

Ibid., 5.

*' Michelle Mattson, “Transportation o f Radioactive Materials in Our Backyards-A
State's Perspective,” 51.
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will override a DOT inconsistency ruling. A State can appeal to the courts for a
preemption exception when all administrative remedies have failed. A state may receive
a preemption exception if it can show that its regulations are based upon concern for the
safety o f its citizens as opposed to an attempt to merely prevent the transportation o f
waste.
A carrier transporting highly radioactive materials must operate on a "preferred
route" which consists of:^’
an interstate system highway fo r which an alternative route is not
designated by a state routing agency, and a, state designated route
selected by a state routing agency in accordance with the D O T
"Guidelines fo r Selecting Preferred highway Routes fo r Highway Route
Controlled Quantity Shipment o f Radioactive Materials.
Shippers o f radioactive materials must use preferred routes that reduce time in
transit. This is because the waste containers are not able to prevent the release o f some
radiation. A route that minimizes time in transit diminishes the amoimt o f radiation
released during routine transportation. If a state does not designate a preferred route, the
DOT regulations require carriers to use interstate highways because they reduce travel
time and guarantee an available transport route for the waste.
State selected routes are preempted by federal regulation if:”
•

it prohibits transportation between two points without providing an alternative:

Dept, o f Transportation, Guidelines fo r Selecting Preferred Highway Route Controlled
Quantity Shipment o f Radioactive Materials (Wash DC: 1992), 2.
” Mattson, Michelle, “Transportation of Radioactive Materials in Our Backyards-A
State's Perspective,” 52.
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• is not established by a state routing agency;
• there is no comparative radiological risk study;
•

there is no consideration o f risks to affectedjurisdictions',

•

there is no continuity o f routes between jurisdictions.
The process o f comparing routes for transportation is crucial for states concerned

about radioactive waste transportation. These route comparisons are important to states
because o f the length o f time the transportation will take place. The period o f time the
DOE estimates the entire shipping campaign will last for 30 years. The distance traveled
is also significant. A single trip from the Peachbottom nuclear power plant in
Peimsylvania to Yucca Moimtain will be approximately 1750 miles. The waste will be
transported through many o f the most populous areas of the US.” How to compare the
risk o f transporting the waste is the bone o f contention.

The Two Worlds of Risk Assessment
Susan Jasanoff (past President o f the Society for Risk Analysis), referred to the
competing views of risk as the Two worlds" o f risk assessment (perhaps in reference to
C.P Snow’s description o f two worlds o f intellectual life).^’ Jasanoff lauded the
achievements of the two approaches and bemoaned the lack o f cooperation between them.
Her comments indicate how even experienced risk assessors misimderstand the
fundamental distinction between these two worlds. In her comments, Jasanoff

” Paul Standish, “Current Status o f DOE’s Transportation Program,” interview by
author. Las Vegas, NV 28 Jan. 1997.
” Sheila Jasanoff, “Bridging the Two Cultures o f Risk Analysis,” Risk Analysis. (1989):
123.
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distinguished between quantitative and qualitative risk. She indicated that quantitative
risk assessment is performed by physical scientists while qualitative risk assessors use
qualitative methods.’" Hers is an ironic, but common mistake. The Society for Risk
Analysis was founded by Paul Slovic, a social scientist, who is renowned for his use of
quantitative methods to measure public perception o f risk.” On the other hand, a physical
scientist used qualitative methods to show that Canadian nuclear power was safe.^* The
way to differentiate between the worlds of risk assessment is not methodological. The
difference lay in how risk is defined.

Perspectives on Risk
Policy discussion about risk assessment is fairly new. Although the first modem
writing about risk and policy was done by Frank Knight in the 1920s, it was not imtil a
1969 article by Chauncey Starr that the current debate over risk policy took shape.^" Starr
established the most widely used measurement for risk assessment policy - risk o f death.
His definition o f risk is the singular feature o f expert risk assessment.
Expert Risk Assessment
Starr argued that society revealed its preferences for risk based on its willingness
to accept the deaths caused by policies and natural phenomena. He calculated the

36

Jasanoff “Bridging the Two Cultures of Risk Analysis,” 125.

” Society for Risk Analysis, Society for Risk Analysis homepage (New York, NY :
SRA, accessed data 8 March, 1998); available from the website http//sra.org.
” Shrader-Frechette. Risk and Rationality, 63-64.
” Kristin Shrader-F rechette. Risk and Rationality, 14-23.
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probabilities o f mortality in given situations, e.g.. the Viemam War. disease, automobile
accidents and then compared them. Starr argued that this comparison revealed society's
implicit acceptance of the alternative policies and hazards. The United States was willing
to accept a given number o f deaths caused by a policy or behavior in exchange for the
benefits received. These "revealed preferences," he argued, should be the explicit basis
for evaluating public policy.*" Starr's technique was typical of the ambitions o f the
scientific social science of the 1960's.
Starr's method of measuring risk was widely accepted and has been incorporated
into legislation. The probability of death is the accepted measure of risk in areas as
diverse as cancer research, air quality, and emergency management. Policy makers hoped
that such comparisons would inform public opinion about policies that involved risk.
Starr hoped to articulate a way to evaluate public policy that was value-free. The expert
view o f risk conforms to positivist philosophy in that they restrict their inquiry to
observable phenomena that do not address problems of human perception, evaluation,
and values.
Positivism in risk assessment is a commitment to obtaining factual knowledge
about the risk imder consideration. Fischer defines positivism as:*'

..a term used to refer to the legacy o f a Philosophical movement

*“ Chauncey Starr, “Social Benefit versus Technological Risk Science,” 165 Science
(1969): 1232-1238.
•41

Frank Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy, 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26
called 'logical positivism. ' Originally developed in reference to the
natural and physical sciences. Positivism advances a theory’ o f
knowledge based on the rigorous testing o f empirical
propositions.
Positivist social science, founded on specific
normative and empirical assumptions, employs deductive methods
to construct and empirically test hypotheses. It seeks to define the
epistemological and methodological foundations o f verifiable
causal explanations and general laws.
In risk assessment, positivism manifests itself by defining risk in a way that is
accessible to analytic techniques. Fischer states:** "Positivism is distinguished by
developing causal models with predictive power." This is a clear characteristic o f expert
risk assessment which harnesses: cost benefit analysis, experimental research design,
multiple regression analysis, survey research, and mathematical simulation models to
make inferences about the risks posed by certain programs or policies.
In HLW transportation, the expert view o f risk assessment hopes to generalize
past experience (e.g. fatal accident rates) and predicted performance (e.g. the durability of
waste containers in accidents) to the present. The hope of expert risk assessment in
transporting HLW is to sidestep political influence in route selection. The ambition o f the
expert risk assessors is that their epistemology will make for successful public policy.
The progenitor of the expert view, Chauncey Starr asserted that "the issue o f public safety
can be focused on a tangible, quantitative engineering design objective."*^
Shrader-Frechette dubbed Starr's view of risk as "naive-positivist" because o f its

*’ Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy. 11.
*^ Starr, “Social Benefit versus Technological Risk,” 1232.
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narrow definition of risk.” Chapter 2 will examine expert risk assessment in greater detail

through a case study. Starr's method was immediately attacked. His article had the effect
o f causing other theories about risk to form into a coherent criticism o f his approach.
Democratic Risk Assessment
The alternative perspective on risk was most famously articulated by the
anthropologist Mary Douglas and her colleague, the late political scientist, Aaron
Wildavsky. They suggested that societies decide what they will and will not define as
dangerous behavior.** They argue that Starr's attempt to measure and manage risk is
futile because cultural effects make it impossible to distinguish between competing risk
assessments. The democratic world o f risk assessment uses a broader definition o f risk
that encompasses more than the probability o f death. Specifically, it defines risk in a way
that acknowledges human motivation.
Various authors have used other measures and more sophisticated methods to
define and measure risk. Such measures include potential danger to environmentally
sensitive locations, threats to an area’s economy, costs for Governmental services, among
others. The inability to agree on a definition of risk has contributed to the policy
stalemate. Chapter 3 will examine the democratic view o f risk is greater detail.

Comparing the Worlds of Risk Assessment

” S hrader-F rechette. Risk and Rationality, 29-33.
** Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and Culture, 3.
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In what follows, the two worlds o f risk assessment (expert and democratic) will be

described by applying procedures contained in two documents to the problem of route
selection. In Chapter 2, the expert view of risk will be studied by applying the risk
assessment criteria contained in the Guidelines fo r Selecting Preferred Highway Routes
fo r Highway Route Controlled Quantity Shipments o f Radioactive Materials hereafter
referred to as the "Guidelines."*" These are the criteria used by states to choose between
alternate routes for transporting high level waste (HLW). The Guidelines will be applied
to the problem o f selecting a route through the State o f Nevada. The results obtained by
applying the Guidelines will be evaluated by using Frank Fischer's framework for policy
analysis. This evaluation will highlight the limitations and embedded assumptions
contained in the Guidelines.
In Chapter 3, the democratic view of risk will be explained by applying the
criticisms o f the DOE process contained in Guidelines on the Scope, Content, and Use o f
Comprehensive Risk Assessment in the Management o f High Level Nuclear Waste
Transportation by Dominic Golding and Allen White.*’ The comments in this report will
be applied to the same problem o f selecting routes. This will demonstrate that the
democratic view of risk fares no better than the expert view. By using Fischer's
framework, this study will show that the democratic view of risk remains unable to

*" Dept, o f Transportation, Guidelines fo r Selecting Preferred Highway Route Controlled
Quantity Shipment o f Radioactive Materials (Wash DC 1992).
*’ Dominic Golding, and Allen White, Guidelines on the Scope, Content, and Use o f
Comprehensive Risk Assessment in the Management o f High-Level Nuclear Waste
Transportation, ( Carson City, NV: Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office, 1990).
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distinguish between risk and therefore, unable to shape policy. Fischer's framework
reveals the shortcomings o f both views of risk.
F ran k Fischer's Fram ework for Policy Analysis
Fischer's framework asks whether or not a policy analysis actually works. It takes
a broad view o f what the goal o f policy analysis should be and provides context for
methodological and empirical debate about a particular policy. This framework is
especially useful in the case o f radioactive waste transportation because;
•
•
•
•

There are two clearly identifiable perspectives in HL W transportation risk
assessment, each with a strong coalition.
Extensive research has been conducted by persons on both sides o f the issue.
There is confusion about why neither perspective has achieved widespread
acceptance, with the affected public
Policy making has been stifled by the stalemate between the two worlds.
Discussion about the risks o f transporting HLW takes place at what Fischer

describes as "different levels o f discourse."** He believes that participants in many policy
debates often argue at different levels. Fischer cites the example of the Head Start
program. Supporters o f the program focused on statistical measures o f progress made by
the policy. Opponents argued that the Head Start program was so flawed that no
quantitative measure o f progress was of any use. The program itself should be scrapped.
This example characterizes the current situation in selecting routes for HLW
transportation. Proponents o f the DOE program willingly accept the simplifying
assumptions inherent in expert risk assessment. Opponents o f the program seek to

48

Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy, 10-12.
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broaden the definition risk so that transporting the waste becomes problematic. Fischer
intends his framework to reconcile these normative and empirical dimensions o f policy.
He recognizes that empirical data and methods are routinely used by both sides of a
policy debate, but that empirical data is unable to resolve policy controversy by itself.
This incapacity lifts policy discussion to higher levels.
Fischer's model postulates four levels. It operates by posing questions to the
policy being evaluated. These questions force policy discussion away from routine
matters of methodology and empirical problems to deeper questions about equity and
justice. Fischer's model categorizes the discussion that takes place about policy. It
becomes possible to place the argument about risk into perspective. It is important to
recognize that Fischer's typology places distinct boundaries aroimd the levels o f policy
discussion where they may not be quite so distinct. This is done for convenience only. In
practice, these boundaries are blurred. Fischer also recognizes that policy discussion is
discursive. Discussion about policy involves all of the levels o f discussion o f policy at
different times. These phases take place concurrently and some receive more or less
attention at different times in the debate.
Competing sides in the risk debate talk aroimd each other rather than address the
substance of their issue. The Fischer framework analyses policy at levels beyond the
empirical discussion that has left risk assessment stuck in the mire. It challenges
competing viewpoints to display their political philosophies and ambitions for society.
The framework consists o f the levels described below.
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Program Verification

The first level o f policy discourse described by Fischer, is called "program
verification." In this level of discussion, programs that implement the policy must
demonstrate how well or poorly they fulfill the stated policy goals. This level focuses on
empirical data and methodology. At each level Fischer asks questions o f the policy The
questions at this level are:
•
•
•

Does the program empirically fulfill its stated objectives?
Does the empirical analysis uncover secondary or unanticipated effects that offset the
pro gram objectives?
Does the program fidfill the objectives more efficiently than alternative means
available?
At this level o f analysis, the facts of the policy are compiled and discussed at a

very basic level. Discussion about how probabilities are measured, what data to use, and
how the data should be manipulated take place at this level. This is a low level o f
analysis in that it does not seek to examine anything besides the immediate issues o f
implementing the policy in question.
2.

Situational Validation

Situational validation moves policy debate to a higher level of analysis that asks
normative rather than empirical or methodological questions. The three questions posed
at this level are:
•
•
•

Is the program objective(s) relevant to the problem situation?
Are there circumstances in the situation that require an exception be made to the
objective (s) ?
Are two or more objectives equally relevant to the problem situation?
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Al this level the policy must demonstrate that it is the best method to meet the
objectives. In this case, if it assumed that the risks must be compared, then the
methodology used to compare those risks must demonstrate that it is the best available
alternative.
3.

Societal Vindication

At this level of discussion, Fischer poses the following questions:
•
•
•

Does the policy goal have instrumental or contributive value fo r the society as a
whole?
Does the policy goal result in unanticipated problems with important societal
consequences?
Does a commitment to the policy’ goal lead to consequences (e.g. benefits and costs)
that are judged to be equally distributed?
These questions move the debate to a completely different level. Here, the

discussion becomes familiar to a broader audience. Should the opinions of experts
receive greater credence than the opinions of the affected public? In this level of policy
discourse about HLW transportation, the role of expert judgment is the issue concealed
behind all o f the technical discussion about risk assessment. At this level, these concerns
are applied to the problem o f how decisions about technology are made.
4. Social Choice
At this level questions about the policy are applied to the society as a whole. The
questions asked o f expert assessors influence decisions where human values are
intrinsically at stake, yet their answers are not incorporated into the assessment.
Discussion about nuclear power, risk assessment and transporting radioactive waste is
also about the kind o f society we live in and what we value. Choosing routes for
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transporting radioactive waste is really about how we make judgments which influence
our lives in the future.
An underlying assumption made by many risk assessors is that their analyses are
the result o f a deductive process that is free o f bias. The entire appeal of risk assessment
is that it would provide an objective basis for comparing policies. In this sense, it is
closely related to cost-benefit analysis. A growing body o f work shows that risk
assessors themselves are blind to the bias and error contained in their work. The problem
multiplies because the managers and policy makers who are the consumers of risk
analysis are lead to believe, falsely, that the assessments they use to manage policy are
free o f bias. As a result, the public may be forced to endure the guesses o f risk assessors
repackaged as objective truth. Fischer's model both illuminates and oversimplifies. But
it does highlight those questions that are never discussed and seldom reflected upon.

An Alternative Process
In Chapter 4 the study will propose a new process for performing risk assessments
that avoids the pitfalls of expert and democratic views o f risk. The proposed process
draws on the experience o f transportation planners and their method of reconciling
technical knowledge with political decision making. This new view of risk assessment
subordinates the problems o f deduction in risk assessment by seeking legitimacy as a
crucial objective for any risk assessment. It is worthwhile to point out that risk
assessments have different objectives. Some risk assessments have small technical
audiences as their audience. The recommended alternative procedure is meant to apply
only to those risk assessments that will affect the public at large.
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The problem o f assessing and communicating the risk of transporting radioactive
waste is emblematic of the larger problem o f managing technology. Often demonstrated
man-made dangers have given rise to public concern about the development and
deployment of technology. This concern is manifesting itself in several ways. The
experience of transportation planners is especially useful in this case. This study will
point to parallels between the seemingly technical practice o f risk assessment and the
field o f transportation planning in local government. At first glance, they appear to have
little in common. However, closer inspection will highlight the similarity of the
problems faced by the two groups.

Why is it Important?
Public fear is eroding popular support for scientific projects. Citizens groups have
effectively blocked or derailed many projects, ranging from the development o f bacteria
that prevent frost damage to crops to the licensing o f nuclear power plants. This study is
important because it points the way to a practical solution to the problem of selecting
routes for transporting spent nuclear fuel and has broader applications. It examines why
policy analysis in the field has failed to provide meaningful guidance to decision makers.
The problem identified here is an example o f how difficult it is to reconcile scientific
understanding and democracy. The process for performing risk assessment developed in
this study is explicitly intended for use outside the field o f transporting radioactive waste.
But the problem of achieving public acceptance of nuclear waste transportation is by no
means negligible.
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In April 1996, the French government transported a container of radioactive waste
to a storage facility at Gorleben, Germany.” Because of previous protests, the French
government released misleading and false information about the time and location o f the
shipment. Despite this ruse, several thousand German protesters intercepted the shipment
en route to the Gorleben waste site. The protesters ripped up rail lines and signal boxes
and attempted to destroy the road leading to the storage facility. The protests resulted in
a riot that injured 30. While the shipments were delivered to the Gorleben facility despite
the protest, this was a serious demonstration o f how public fears combined with
opposition to nuclear power can create violent activism.
Advocates of risk assessment hope to persuade the public to accept risky
technologies through the use o f “value-free” calculations. They have not been successful.
The expert view of risk assumes that objective, value-free assessments of risk are
possible. Chapter Two will demonstrate that the numerous empirical assumptions made
by expert risk assessors reflect support for the technocratic model o f knowledge.

Allen Cowen, “Thousands in Germany Protest a Shipment of Nuclear Waste” New
York Times, May 9,1996, A4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36

CHAPTER 2

EXPERT RISK ASSESSMENT

Fischer’s critique o f positivist methods of policy analysis closely parallels
critiques of the Guidelines. This chapter will: 1) provide a more detailed accoimt o f the
development of expert risk assessment in the transportation field, 2) examine the expert
view o f risk by applying procedure for route comparison contained in the Guidelines to
the State of Nevada, and 3) critique the Guidelines using Fisher's policy framework.
In 1987, the Congress designated the interstate highway system as “preferred
routes for shipping HLW.*° This designation ensured that routes would be available to
ship HLW. Congress also recognized that states may want waste transported on routes
that do not belong to the interstate system and directed the DOT to develop a process to
compare potential shipping routes. Although this chapter focuses on the Guidelines, it is
important not to lose sight of Congress’ attitude toward risk as expressed by the
designation of preferred routes. Congress’ stance suggests that they are willing to accept
highway transportation of radioactive waste through major metropolitan areas in order to

Dept. ofEnexgy, Nuclear Waste Policy Act as Amended (Wash DC: USDOE, 1994)
14.
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facilitate the waste disposal program.

The Development of Transportation Risk Assessment
It is appropriate that the first studies o f transportation risk were sponsored by
agencies interested in measuring the safety o f transporting radioactive materials. The
problems posed by nuclear materials have always been reckoned susceptible to scientific
analysis, and federal research grants opened the door to such analysis. Each o f the
advances in risk assessment cited below occurred with the patronage o f the federal
government in support o f the nuclear industry.*'
In 1958 F.F. Liemkuhler analyzed the frequency and severity o f truck accidents.
He used regression analysis to correlate accident frequency, cargo type, and season o f the
year. The study presented probabilit)' distributions for the impact o f collisions between
vehicles at different angles and stratified these results according to the type o f roadway.
Probabilities for four-lane roads, divided highways and high and low traffic volumes
were calculated and the results extrapolated to apply to radioactive materials.*’
While this study was the first to use probabilities to predict the consequences of
accidents, it was severely limited because the only data available were for the cargo
damage to new automobile transport. The study highlighted the difficulty o f forecasting
without reliable data, and indicated that the procedures used in the study could be applied
to a range o f problems beyond accident forensics. The study was the first attempt at

*' William Rhyne, Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Analysis, (New York: Van
Nostrand Rheinhold, 1994), 15-21.
52
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prediction in the field o f expert risk assessment. Past accidents revealed significant
correlations that could be used to forecast future events.
Liemkuhler's work had no ambitions in the arena o f public policy. His study was
a narrowly focused attempt to tease out meaningful correlations that could be used by
radioactive materials shippers to identify optimal transportation conditions. The study
was not widely disseminated except to transportation professionals. This study paved the
way for analyzing transportation accidents with the same process used in engineering
safety analysis
The next major step forward in transportation risk assessment occurred in the late
1960’s when William Brobst, o f the Atomic Energy Commission, developed a method for
classifying rail and highway accident severity in terms o f impact speed and fire
characteristics. The crucial distinguishing feature o f Brobst’ work was that he included a
conditional probability of container damage for accidents o f various severity and used
probabilities to forecast accident consequences. His work inaugurated “probabilistic risk
assessment” as a subset o f quantitative risk assessment in the transportation field.”
Another characteristic o f the expert view of risk becomes clear fi-om Brobst's
work. Brobst' admits that a great deal of engineering judgm ent is included in his figures.
The values in his study are based on “gross judgm ent and the very limited data
available.”” Brobst's study occurred at an ironic time. Just as questions about the safety

” Ibid., 16.
” Ibid., 19
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o f nuclear power became more common, the ambitions of expert risk assessors took them
further from the empirical data they purport to rely on. When data are absent or too
expensive to collect, expert judgment is introduced and often not rigorously documented.
A common defense of expert risk assessment is that it is "logical," or "scientific."** This
cltum is made despite the inevitable presence of expert judgment in even the most
rigorous risk assessment.
In 1976, a third major iimovation in expert risk assessment took place when
Sandia National Laboratories released a study which reported probabilistic distributions
for the magnitude of mechanical and thermal stress results from accident forces.*" In this
study, engineering models were substituted for empirical data. This study is important
because it marked the first use of computer simulation in the field. The debate over
computer testing versus full-size cask testing continues to this day.
The study is significant because it marks the inauguration of computer simulation
as a technique to compensate for missing data. In this case, the knowledge about the
safety o f the containers was inferred solely from the results of computer models without
any empirical data. A model constructed without empirical data relies heavily on expert
judgment. Indeed, the Sandia study was expert judgment codified as a computer
program.
Computer models were immediately used by the DOE to examine risk and

** Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality, 39.
*" Rhyne, Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Analysis, 17.
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routing. RADTRAN. STATEGEN, HIGHWAY. RAILLINE. and INTERLINE are all
transportation risk assessment computer programs produced and maintained by the
Department of Energy for the express purpose of assessing the risk o f transporting
HLW.” The results o f these computer models have been indifferent. On the one hand,
they are used because "that's all we have." On the other hand, they are seldom effective
in dealing with the public. When the Carolina Environmental Study Group sued Duke
Power over plant safety, one o f the issues in the lawsuit was that the RADTRAN model
used by Duke Power assumed that no container would ever have a hole in it larger than
one inch in diameter.** Expert risk assessment often relies heavily on computer
simulation without qualifying the results o f the models as largely the product o f expert
judgment.
These studies all advanced the methods used to perform an analysis o f the risk of
transporting radioactive materials. They adapted quantitative tools and procedures from
engineering to address a narrow technical audience comfortable with using expert
judgment. None o f these studies was originally intended as a public policy instrument.
Some catalyst was necessary to bring expert risk assessment out of the cloisters o f the
national laboratories and into public view.
In 1969, Chauncey Starr wrote an influential article in Science magazine which

*’ Department of Energy, TRANSNET homepage (Albuquerque, NM: DOE, accessed
data 5 May, 1998); available at website http:// www.sandia.gov/ ttp/flyers/ transnet/
transnet.htm
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advocated numerical comparison o f risks as the basis for public policy.” Quantitative
revolutions were sweeping many disciplines at that time and quantitative methodologies
held out the hope o f "value-free" policy formation.*® Starr felt this was possible. He
argued that implicit in every nonarbitrary national decision on the use o f technology is a
trade-off o f societal benefits and societal costs."*'
Starr made two assumptions in developing his ideas: 1) that historical national
accident records are adequate for revealing consistent patterns of fatalities in the public
use of technology and 2) that such historically revealed social preferences and costs are
sufficiently enduring to permit their use for predictive purposes.*' These “revealed
preferences” should be used, he argued, to guide policy makers.
His arguments framed the ideology of expert risk assessment. The characteristics
o f Starr’s viewpoint are very clear: 1) The consequences of a policy or program can be
understood only when they are reduced to the probability of death. 2) The influence of
human behavior need not be considered because they are already contained in the fatality
rates. 3) Considerations o f equity or the distribution of risk is irrelevant in the face of
quantifiable death rates. Despite numerous refinements, the process sketched out by Starr

” Starr, “Technological Risk versus Societal Benefit,” 1232
*° Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy, 15..
*' Starr, “Technological Risk versus Societal Benefit,” 1232.
*- Ibid., 1232
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remains standard practice in the field o f risk assessment.*^

Route Selection with the Guidelines
The route comparison procedure contained in the Guidelines provides a
mechanical method for distinguishing between routes that is entirely consistent with
Chaimcey Starr’s ideal. The route selection process described in the Guidelines
distinguishes between alternate routes by applying three criteria to each potential route.
They are:
•

Normal Radiation Exposure

•

Public Health Risk

•

Economic Consequences
The first criterion is the radiation exposure caused by the accident-free

transportation of the waste containers on highways. None o f the containers used to hold
the waste can completely shield the truck driver or nearby motorists from some radiation
exposure. The Guidelines argue that since the likelihood o f an accident is small, normal
radiation exposure is the most significant risk associated with the shipments. This
criterion seeks the shortest path from the origin o f the trip to the destination. The shortest
path will minimize the time in transit and, therefore, the radiation exposure for people
living adjacent to the route.
The second criterion is the public health risk fi-om accidents. This benchmark
measures the health effects of an accident which breeches the container holding the

63

Rhyne, Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Analysis, 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43
waste. If a container breaks open, radioactive particles can spread in an airborne plume.
The Guidelines assume that radioactivity will spread up to ten miles downwind from an
accident and will contaminate an area of approximately 25 square miles. This criterion
minimizes the population exposed to radiation by avoiding densely populated regions.
The last criterion used to select routes is the economic risk of transporting the
w aste. The economic risk is defined as the cost of decontaminating buildings adjacent to
the route. The factor provides an estimate o f the total cost to decontaminate areas
affected by radiation. The Guidelines ignore any economic costs beyond
decontamination costs. This criterion seeks the route with the lowest cost to
decontaminate.
The chosen routes are evaluated for each criterion. The criteria are compared and
if no route is significantly better than any other, the criterion are normalized to calculate
an index o f risk that combines the three factors. The Guidelines also designate three
secondary factors that are evaluated optionally and are not used for this study.

The DOT Route Selection Process
The route selection process contained in the Guidelines is performed in the
following steps:
•

Determine highway route that minimizes impacts

•

Identify alternative highway routes available in consultation with affected
jurisdictions

•

Develop list o f route comparison factors

•

Evaluate route comparison factors for each alternative highway route
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•

Select route that best minimizes impacts based on evaluation o f route comparison
factors

•

Document entire routing analysis to serve as the basis fo r the routing decision
The Guidelines create a reliable process for comparing routes. This process is

consistent with expert risk assessment because the criteria for evaluating routes is
confined to measurable variables. The process is also objective in the sense that if the
same numbers and formulae are used, different parties will obtain the same results
regardless o f their personal prejudices or opinions. The Guidelines reflect Chaimcey
Starr’s hopes for policy analysis free from values.

The DOT Process Applied to Clark County
The process used to apply the Guidelines to Clark county is given below:
1. Identify the default Interstate route and State of Nevada designated alternatives
2. Arrange data to conform to the standards required for analysis
3. Calculate criteria for State designated alternatives and the default Interstate routes
4. Calculate risk indices for the default Interstate route and compare them to proposed
State alternatives
Each step is described below.

1. Identify default Interstate route and State of Nevada designated alternatives
The default route through Clark County to the NTS is depicted in Figure 2-1.
county to the NTS. This route uses Interstate 15 traveling south firom the Utah border to
the US 95 interchange and then through the northwest part o f Clark Coimty to the NTS.
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Yucca Mtn.
CLARK MV

\ e

MOHAVE AZ

INOCA

California

Figure 2-1 The default preferred route through Clark County, Nevada

The State o f Nevada has designated several alternatives to the default route.
These routes were chosen to avoid the most densely populated regions of Clark County.
They have never been evaluated using the criteria contained in the Guidelines. These
alternative routes are in Figure 2-2.
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LINCOLN NV

Nevada

:ca Mtn.
CLARK NV

Route A

®

MOHAVEAZ

tOINO CA

Figure 2-2 State designated alternative routes A and B

Route A uses Interstate 40 to connect to Interstate 15 near Barstow California.
The route travels north into Clark County up to State Route 160 and then out o f Clark
County and north to the Nevada Test Site. Route B passes north from Interstate 40 on US
95 and then over State Route 164 to Interstate 15 and then out o f Clark County to the
Nevada Test Site through California. Routes A and B share links on road segments. All
o f the segments on route A are on route B.

2. Arrange data to conform to standards required for analysis
After identifying the routes, it was necessary to segment the routes in a way that
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conforms to the population data.^ This enables the population risk to be calculated. Each
route was divided into links with nodes at the census tract boundaries created and
maintained by the US Bureau of the Census. The census tract boundaries and the
population data comes from a commercially available data base that uses the 1995 update
to the 1990 census.
Each road segment was assigned a unique number and was used to organize and
analyze the data. The Clark County road data is from the street centerline file maintained
by Clark County. This is the most up to date record of the County’s road network. Road
segments that could be used as routes from the Interstate 15 to the NTS are depicted. The
next step o f the data conversion was to add necessary data to each road segment. The
following data were assigned to each road segment:

^ The following comments describe how the data was organized. Some segments were
so long that there were multiple speed zones on a segment. In these cases, the mean
average speeds were calculated and applied to the segment. Average annual daily traffic
(.AADT), which indicates the number of vehicles using the route during a 24 hour period
averaged over a year, was added to the route segment. The road data used in the analysis
are all current as o f 1995, with the exception o f the national accident averages. These
averages are current as o f 1992, when they were published in the Guidelines. In cases
where there were multiple traffic counts on a segment, the number was averaged and
applied to the sections.
Accident rates and accident information was obtained from the Nevada State Office o f
Public Safety which compiles information for inclusion into the US DOT’s Fatal
Accident Reporting System (EARS). This data is for 1995 and is the most current
information available. Distances between opposing lanes was obtained by personal
survey o f the alternate routes. Locations o f segment endpoints were determined and the
routes were examined to obtain first-hand knowledge o f the distance and road conditions.
The land use information was obtained from the Clark County Regional Transportation
Commission’s land use data base. Land use polygons were merged according to the land
use scheme mandated by the Guidelines.
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• segment number
• segment endpoints
•

segment length

•

average speed

•

distance between opposing lanes

•

population count 0-5 Miles

•

population count 5-10 Miles

•

daily traffic count (Average Annual Daily Traffic)

•

daily truck count

•

annual number o f deaths (Nevada figures)

•

accident rate per million truck miles (Nevada figures)

•

accident rate per thousand shipments (National averages)

3. Calculate criteria fo r State designated alternatives and the default Interstate routes
The route comparison factors were calculated for each o f the route segments. The
calculations are presented in Appendix 1. Several road segments were divided into
multiple portions to enable more accurate representation of the roadway.The route with
the lowest factor is the preferred route.The preferred route factors are marked in bold
letters.
A. Normal Exposure Factor
The first criteria calculated was the normal exposure factor. The normal radiation
exposme factor estimates the radiation exposure caused by the routine transportation of
fuel. The factors considered in the equation are:
•

Dose to people at truck stops (D4)

•

Dose to truck crew (D3)
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•

Dose to passengers in other vehicles (D2)

•

Dose to persons residing along route (D1 )

The total risk is the sum o f these factors: D1 + D2 + 03 + D4
The equation used to calculate this factor is:
_
PL _
LT _
LT ,
L
D =
C 1 + ——C2 -I
C j 4—
V

v2

Vj

V

where:
D = normal radiation exposure comparison factor
P-

average population density along the route (people per square mile)

L = length o f route (miles)
T = average annual daily traffic along the route
V = average speed o f vehicles on the route (mph)
C l = Constant 6.7*10-5 (Average distance between opposing lanes)
C2 = Conversion factor (Average vehicle separation distance)
C3 = Conversion factor from Table
The spreadsheets that contain the calculations are found in Appendix 1. The
results o f this calculation are:
Default interstate route:

7.06

Route A:

.164

Route B:

.853

The preferred route based on this criteria is Route A because it has the least radiation
exposure.
B. Population Exposure Factor
The next step was to calculate the risk to the population living along each route.
Risks o f accidental release depend on two factors: 1) Thefrequency o f accidents that
could result in a release and 2) the consequences of such an accident.The route
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population risk factor is determined by multiplying the frequency by the consequences o f
an accident. To calculate the frequency, the accident rate in units of accidents per vehicle
mile are multiplied by the route length.

For this analysis the national truck accident rate

was used. The other variable, accident consequences, is calculated by multiplying the
population living within bands around the road segment by multipliers contained in the
Guidelines. The multipliers are:
Population Band Boundary

Health. Consequences Multipliers

0-5 miles

.75

5-10 miles

.25
Figure 2-3 Accident consequences

These multipliers adjust accident consequences to reflect the decreased effect o f
radiation as distance form the accident increases. The result of this multiplication is then
divided by the length o f the route segment to identify the consequences o f an accident.
This number is then multiplied by the accident frequency to determine the population
exposure factor. The maps in figures 2-4 and 2-5 depict the buffers surrounding the
alternate routes.
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Figure 2-4 Five and ten mile buffers around the default route
NYENV

LINCOLN NV

Nevada

Y u c c a M tn.
CLARK NV

INYO CA
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i:-

MOHAVE AZ

IINOCA

California

Route B

Figure 2-S Five and ten mile buffers around the A and

B routes
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The population exposure factor for the considered routes is:
Default Route:

.42674

Route A:

.0 3 2 5

Route B:

.0335

Route A is the optimal route based on the population risk criteria.
C. Economic Consequence Factor
The release o f radioactive materials will have economic impacts. These impacts
are measured in the Guidelines by calculating the cost o f decontaminating the irradiated
land and buildings. The economic consequence measure multiplies the land use within
bands along the road segment by multipliers to arrive at a cost of decontamination. The
multipliers are:

Economic-Measnre
Land use type

0-5 mile Band:

5-10 Mile
Band

Rural (applies to vacant land also)

.002

.0002

Single family

.10

.04

Multi-family

2.0

.20

Commercial/Industrial

.20

.01

Parks

.03

.02

Public Areas

.50

.05

Residential

Figure 2-6 Land use multipliers

The land use areas are multiplied by the economic consequence measure and
summed to obtain a total value for each road segment. This product is multiplied by the
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accident rate to create the economic consequence measure. The spreadsheets used to
calculate the economic consequence measure are presented in Appendix 1. The economic
consequence measure for each route is:
Default route:

.0002

Route A:

.000048

Route B:

.00005

Based on the evaluation. Route A is the optimal route. The economic consequences
factor is the most controversial of the three primary criteria. Theories about risk
perception have focused much attention on the incompleteness of this measure. Problems
o f the distributional effects o f the radiation, long term impacts on land value and public
health are all ignored.

DOT Route Selection Results
The Department of Transportation methodology produces a reliable result that
clearly differentiates one route from others. The results are presented below:

Default Route

0.42674

0.0002

Route A

0.0761

0.000488

Route B

0.0335

0.0005

Figure 2-7 Unadjusted route selection results

The Guidelines effectively discriminate between rates. The expert risk assessor would
argue that the analysis presented above is sufficient. Unfortimately, the issues in route
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selection are not so cut and dried.

Evaluation of the Route Selection Process
Discussion about route selection remains mired in methodological swamps.
Various parties examine the efficacy o f individual parts of the Guidelines without placing
discussion about risk assessment in its broader context. Fisher's framework o f policy
discourse is useful for this purpose because it lifts the policy analysts' attention away
from the mundane problems presented by methodological discussion to fit risk
assessment in its broader context. This section will look at the Guidelines with Fisher’s
framework and examine the difficulties o f expert risk assessment.
1. Program Verification
At the first level, the observed performance o f the policy is evaluated. Fisher's
framework demands that the facts o f the policy show they are relevant to the problem.
Does the policy perform as advertised?

At first glance, the Guidelines appear to provide

a meaningful basis for comparing routes. The Guidelines, when applied to the state of
Nevada, did distinguish between three routes. The numerical calculations are
straightforward and the data are readily available. Fisher's' first question can be
answered affirmatively, but not conclusively. There are two problems with the
Guidelines that are common to any expert risk assessment.

Data Collection
The very act o f collecting and organizing data excludes other information from
being gathered and used. Any expert risk assessment can be assailed for the
incompleteness or poor quality o f data. In the nuclear field, only the acute affects of
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radiation are considered. The long term health effects of low levels o f radiation are
poorly understood and cannot be included in an analysis of this type. The conclusions
drawn by applying the Guidelines are eternally open to question because of incomplete
data.
Another constraint on the data is created by constant changes in reality. The data
we collect today may have no predictive value for the future. Slight changes in the DOE
program can easily make data already collected invalid or obsolete. Formaini cites the
case o f Love Canal to illustrate how facts do not necessarily lead to sound conclusions.
He cites how one firm did blood samples and found "chromosome damage." However,
State investigators did not have the statistical evidence to support the claim.*^
Sometimes the consumers o f expert risk assessment do not imderstand the limitations
imposed by data collected.
In the case o f the Guidelines, each of the variables used to calculate risk are
assumed to be meaningful when applied to a future shipping campaign. The average
annual daily traffic (AADT) number is a case in point. Even if the averaging is accepted,
the dramatic economic growth in the region manifests itself as increasing traffic. This
increase in traffic is extremely variable. The numbers used for one year are not
applicable for the next, the numbers for one route are not necessarily applicable to the
future. These assumptions may be necessary, but they prevent any route comparison
from being beyond question.

Robert Formaini,
Publishers, 1990) P I8.

Myth o f Scientific Public F*o//cy^(NewBninswick:Transaction
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Another case where the data fails is in calculating populations. Population
numbers can be challenged because they reflect nighttime population rather than daytime
employment. The expert view of risk assessment wanders into a methodological hall o f
mirrors from which there is no escape. Critics are free to question and challenge the
assumptions used by the expert risks assessor, while the risk assessor can only appeal to
specific legislation or to the scientific method for support and legitimacy.

But, in

questions of public policy, neither is likely to be held universally meaningful by the
affected parties. Uncertainty about data leads us to ask whether or not the objectives o f
the Guidelines could be more effective using a different method.

Methodological Concerns
Another set o f problems at this level, is that the Guidelines do not necessarily
provide the best method for comparing routes. The Guidelines themselves offer an array
o f alternatives. For example, the Guidelines do not specify which accident rate should be
used to calculate the risk. There are five alternatives cited in the Guidelines.^
•

Truck accident rate

•

Hazardous materials truck accident rate

•

Fatal accident rate

•

Accidents with property damage in excess o f $ 1,000

•

National average accident rates

A risk assessment performed with one accident rate can always be criticized for failing to
use one of the other rates. The selection of an accident rate is ultimately a subjective

** Department o f Transportation , Highway Routing o f Hazardous Materials, Guidelines
fo r Applying Criteria. Wash DC Nov 1996. P 20.
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decision. None o f the accident rates is necessarily better than any o f the others.
The result o f these problems is that the Guidelines fail to guide. The empirical
issues raised at this level o f analysis are insoluble. The Guidelines, to be an effective
policy tool, should resolve empirical questions. They should be able to produce the most
persuasive answer to comparisons of risk. Instead, they raise more questions and direct
critics to alternative answers that can be used to contradict the route selection. The
failure o f the Guidelines points to the next level o f Fisher's analytical framework.
2.

Situational Validation

The failure o f the Guidelines to empirically demonstrate that one route is superior
to another has dampened the ambitions of expert risk assessors. They now defend much
less territory than Starr first described. At this level the questions asked are: Is the
program relevant to the problem situation? The answer for the Guidelines is 'yes.' The
examination o f routes given in the Guidelines is appropriate. Comparing routes using
the factors described is certainly important and useful. However, it may not be the best
process. The quantitative measures developed by the risk assessors are all relevant. But
they can never be sufficiently persuasive to justify adopting the policy based on the
strength o f their argument alone.
Critics o f expert risk assessment have argued in favor o f “comprehensive risk
assessment” which would broaden the definition o f the risks and consequences.*^
Advocates o f expert risk assessment coimter that in order for any risk assessment to be

*■ Golding and White, Guidelines on the Scope, Content, and Use o f Comprehensive Risk
Assessment in the Management o f High-Level Nuclear Waste Transportation^ 2-3.
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performed, the variables considered must be limited rather than expanded.*® The problem

for advocates o f the Guidelines is that the Guidelines are only one method of arriving at a
route selection discussion. Whether or not the Guidelines provide the best method is an
open question. Expert risk assessors themselves argue about the best measures o f risk.
There are numerous alternatives within the field o f expert risk assessment.*’
The most serious problem with the methodology of expert risk assessment relates
to the definitions used by the Guidelines. In this case the most fundamental question is
the risk itself. The traditional measure o f risk is the probability of death. The probability
o f death is expressed as the likelihood o f an event (“hazard” in technical parlance™)
multiplied by the consequences of that event. The problem for the Guidelines is that
most people use a broader definition of risk.^' Indeed, it is hard to come to agreement on
a simple definition of risk. It demonstrates how the expert view of risk reduces the world
to manageable dimensions. In doing so it must lose some of its credibility and much o f
its legitimacy.
Nowhere is the problem of definitions better illustrated than in the measure o f

*®William C. Metz, “Potential Negative Impacts o f Nuclear Activities on Local
Economies: Rethinking the Issue.” Risk Analysis Vol. 14, No. 5 (1994): 763-770.
*’ Emilinda Parentela, A Framework fo r Modeling Risk and Emergency Preparedness in
Hazardous Materials Transportation Ph.D. thesis defense 19 April, 1996, UNLV Las
Vegas, Nevada.
™Rhyne, Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Analysis, I .
Alvin H. Mushkatel, and K. David Pijawka, Institutional Trust, Information and Risk
Perceptions (Carson City, NV: Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office 1992), 10-14.
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economic consequences. The Guidelines definition of economic consequences is open to
question. Social scientists attacked Starr’s definition of risk as inadequate. They felt that
there were other factors to be considered.^ The field of risk perception grew out of
dissatisfaction with the methodology used to analyze risk given its narrow definition.
The cost to decontaminate affected structures is a major indication o f how far the
Guidelines go in abstracting from reality. For example, the long-term impact o f a
radiation spill on families, homes, commerce, and communities is not nearly captured by
that factor. Neither are the "social costs" incorporated into this measure. These costs,
such as costs to local governments for emergency response preparations, are completely
ignored by the Guidelines. This definition o f risk has become a lightning-rod for criticism
o f expert risk assessment. Expert risk assessors are comfortable with the definition, but
few others are.
Discussion about route selection seldom examines the basic methodological
implications caused by the definition o f risk. The desire of the technical experts to
confine the discussion is more the result of their formal training than in a recognition o f
the practical needs of policy making. The Guidelines present problems because although
they are intended to create exceptions to the default interstate route system, they do not
allow for exceptions themselves. At this level o f analysis there is no clear answer.

Douglas Easterling, “Fair Rules for Siting a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository’
Journal o f Policy Analysis and Management vol. 11 No 3, (1992): 443-448.
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Societal Vindication

At this level o f analysis the Guidelines must demonstrate that they have a value to
society. In all of the transportation discussion about HLW, there is little mention of the
fundamental question; Should HLW be transported to a storage facility at all? At this
level o f analysis, in order for the Guidelines to be valuable, they must show that they
provide value to society. They do this only if it is assumed that society desires the waste
to be transported. In the present case, this seems self-evident. The Congress, acting on
behalf o f the American people, voted to enact the program that would require shipments
and created the Guidelines. But there are problems with this assumption. The first is the
inequitable distribution o f impacts. The Guidelines and indeed all of the technical risk
literature is deaf and dumb on the inequitable distribution of risks. Freudenberg refers to
this as “risk assignment.”
Inequitable distribution calls into question the legitimacy o f the Guidelines as a
policy- making instrument. They raise basic political questions about how routes should
be designated. To be fair, the Guidelines are, in this respect, no different than the policies
denominating default routes through the country. This blindness to the inequitable
distribution o f risks raised by the Guidelines is a serious problem that lingers in all of
expert risk assessment.
The second problem created by the Guidelines is that of unintended consequences.

” Lee Clarke and William Freudenberg, “Risk Communication, Recreancy, and
Organizational Effectiveness,” Hazmat Transport Proceedings (Evanston, 11: The
Transportation Center o f Northwestern University, 1991): 4-37-4-42.
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In order for the Guidelines to function, the people affected by the transportation o f HLW
must abandon themselves to the results of a study in which they had no influence. The
Guidelines admit little public complaint and no challenge. In fact the public has no place
in the discussion except as objects to be counted and tallied to generate results.
According to the Department o f Transportation, which promulgated the Guidelines, the
public was excluded because so little is known about HLW.” But this logic seems
inverted: because science cannot tell us much about the problem o f shipping HLW, we
must rely more heavily on the little science we have.
This is not the case in selecting routes for hazardous materials. In hazardous
materials route selection, public agencies and local citizens groups are embedded into the
process as key participants who shape and define relevant issues. It is ironic that the
Guidelines fo r Applying to Criteria to Select Routes fo r Hazardous Materials are also
published by the Department of Transportation.” It seems odd that the public is
involved when private industry shipping is concerned, but when the shipping program is
performed by the Federal Government, the public is excluded.
The Guidelines are in fact anti-democratic and mildly subversive by their
exclusion o f public concerns. By demanding the affected public relinquish its standing in
the route selection process, it denigrates both the public and the local officials elected by

'■*Molly Gamett, o f the Department of Transportation Research and Special Projects
Administration. “DOT’s Rationale for HLW Routing Guidelines,” interview by the
author. Las Vegas, NV, 16 Dec, 1997.
” Department o f Transportation, Highway Routing o f Hazardous Materials, Guidelines
fo r Applying Criteria. Wash DC Nov 1996. P 41.
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that public. Policy discussion about risk assessment seldom addresses this problem.
Instead, the affected public is treated to large doses o f public relations.™
4. Social Choice
At Fisher’s highest level o f analysis, the Guidelines are placed in their broader
context. The Guidelines must demonstrate that they select routes in a way that is
consistent with the accepted social order. Phrased another way: Will the Guidelines be
regarded as legitimate by the people affected by transporting waste? The expert view of
risk exemplified here by the Guidelines does not accomplish this most basic task.
Because the Guidelines may not be regarded by affected stakeholders as
legitimate, they have succumbed to death by inanition. Instead o f a credible policy tool,
the Guidelines' failure to address the need for political legitimacy transforms it into a toy
for engineers and technicians. Since 1987, 15 laws have been passed by Congress that
relate to risk assessment.” Many o f these laws mandate the use and scope o f risk
assessment. Congress, which increasingly relies on assessments of this type, is
progressively abandoning its role as a deliberative body by choosing to rely on technical
experts in order to seek objective answers.
A distinctive feature o f expert risk assessment manifests itself at this level.
Expert risk assessment sacrifices the ability o f the public to shape policy. Aaron

™Craig Walton, "High-Level Ethical Risk" Science, Values and the American West. ed.
Stephen Tchudi. (Reno, NV: Halcyon, 1997): 233-239.
” Aaron Wildavsky, “No Risk is the Highest Risk o f All” American Scientist vol. 67 No
1, (Jan-Feb 1979): 32-37.
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Wildavsky has identified this as a cultural divide. ® The most important goal for the
future o f expert risk assessment to see this cultural dimension o f its own thinking and to
find a way to reconcile technical elegance with democratic concerns. The Guidelines
require the public to abandon their standing in the policy arena and accept a society
driven by the numerical calculations o f technical elites who chose to ignore the disparate
impacts o f their decisions.

Summary
Fischers’ model of policy analysis highlights the many failings o f the Guidelines
as a public policy instrument. The empirical questions raised are unanswerable. On
expert assumptions, there are numerous alternatives to the Guidelines. The Guidelines
themselves have no concern for the distributional effects they cause and finally the
Guidelines require the public to become subservient to the technical world view. This
last is the most important basis for dissent from the expert view o f risk. The vague
discomfort many have with expert risk assessment is focused here. The democratic view
of risk has made many trenchant criticisms o f the expert view of risk. But critics must
demonstrate that they have a better explanation o f risk. Chapter Three will provide the
same examination of democratic risk that was performed for expert risk assessment in
Chapter Two.

78

Ibid., 36.
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CHAPTER 3

DEMOCRATIC RISK ASSESSMENT

Criticism o f expert risk assessment has coalesced into a distinctive approach
referred to here as democratic risk assessment. This chapter will: I) describe democratic
risk assessment; 2) apply the Comprehensive Risk Analysis (CRA) criticisms proposed
by Golding and White to the problem o f selecting routes through the State o f Nevada and
3) analyze CRA with Fischer’s framework. This analysis will highlight the deeper
problems with democratic risk assessment.

What is Democratic Risk Assessment?
It is an ironic characteristic of the democratic view o f risk that democratic theories
about risk lagged behind legal precedent. While Liemkuhler was laying the groundwork
for expert risk assessment in transportation, the Supreme Court established the legal
precedent for the democratic view of risk. In 1959, the Supreme Court awarded damages
on the basis of the perceived loss of value of land due to the siting of power lines in TVA
vs. WillesleyJ'^ The court based its finding on perceived effects, not on any quantitative
evaluation of risk. This finding established a measure of risk inconsistent with the expert
79

TVA

V.

Willsey 20, 235 3 (S. NM. 1992).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
view even before the expert view was fully formed.
Democratic risk assessment treats risk as a social construct that is the result o f
complex interactions between societies, cultures, technology and the natural world. They
argue that no thing possesses risk. Democratic risk assessors argue that risk is a “post
normal” concept that cannot be readily accessed by reason.®® Risk is a function o f how it
can be used by human beings—hence the ever-present subjectivity in all risk
assessments.®' That is, societies pick and choose what is and is not defined as risk. They
argue that the selection o f risk is not based on any quantitative analysis, as in expert
assessment. Rather, the identification and selection of risk is the result o f complex
interactions between culture and the natural world.®*
Mary Douglas through her collaboration with Aaron Wildavsky originally
enunciated the theory. They cite several examples from other cultures to sustain their
point o f view. They take great pains to show that societies make mistakes in risk
selection. The Lele people o f Zaire, for example:®^
...suffered all the usual devastating tropical ills-fever, gastroenteritis,
tuberculosis, leprosy, ulcers, barrenness, and pneumonia. In this world o f
disease, they focused mainly on being struck by lightning, the affliction o f

®° Silvio Functowicz, “Risk Management as a Posmormal Science” Risk Analysis, vol. 12
N o.l (1992): 95.
®' Formaini, The Myth o f Scientific Public P olicy, 16.
®* Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality, 31.
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barrenness, and one disease, bronchitis: they mainly attributed these troubles to

specific types o f immorality in which the victim would generally be seen as
innocent and some powerful leader or village elder would be blamed.
Poor risk selection can even destroy entire societies. Douglas cites the nomadic
Hima people who are convinced that women should be kept completely apart from
cattle.^ The Hima are convinced that human reproduction is an explicit threat to cattle
reproduction.** The result o f the Hima’s complex pollution beliefs is that the tribe’s
population is shrinking rapidly, and the tribe is facing extinction.
Douglas and Wildavsky equate Hima society with our own societies and point out
that our own theories about danger can take on a similar, unrealistic tinge under outside
inspection.** They cite poll results and other numerical measures as proof that modem
technological societies are no different than the misguided Lele or the luckless Hima.*’
This formulation of risk, referred to by Shrader-Frechette as “Cultural-relativism”**
argues that the selection o f dangers and the choice o f social organization nm hand in
hand.*’ In the field o f nuclear safety, the democratic view of risk might have remained
an academic artifact had it not become an essential tool in the debate over risk policy.

*" Ibid. 40.
** Ibid. 41
** Ibid. 44.
*’ Ibid. 44-48
** Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality, 38.
*’ Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and Culture, 186.
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The Reactor Safety Study
In the field o f nuclear power, the democratic view was used to respond to the
Reactor Safety Study (RSS)T This report was commissioned by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to demonstrate to the public that nuclear power was safe.” The
report was a watershed in expert risk analysis because it established the techniques used
by future risk assessors and, most importantly, the study's objective was to influence
public policy.
Unlike previous expert risk assessments, the RSS deliberately sought to sway
public opinion in favor o f nuclear power. This objective is completely consistent with
Starr's goal o f informing public policy by calculating the likelihood of harm. RSS is an
interesting example o f how expert risk assessors think they think. The study group
expressed its results in quantitative terms and believes that this expression o f risk will be
satisfactory to everyone potentially affected by the program. The RSS ignored the role
played by expert judgment in reaching final conclusions. The quantitative approach was,
they thought, sufficient to sway public opinion in favor o f nuclear power. The techniques
used in the study set the standard for all future expert risk assessment. Fault trees,
decision trees and other tools o f the expert risk assessor were all introduced in that

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment o f Accident
Risks in Commercial Nuclear Power Plants WASH-1400 (Washington, DC: National
Research Council 1977).
” Ibid.
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report.” Ironically, despite its technical elegance, the report was important more for the

controversy it created than for its contribution to expert risk assessment.
When the executive summary o f the report was released it caused immediate
controversy for several reasons: 1) the use o f expert judgment in preparing the report was
neither mentioned nor documented. 2) long-term health effects of radiation (in both high
and low doses) were not considered. 3) public input was never solicited, 4) it did not
indicate uncertainties associated with probability estimates, and 5) it did not address
accident initiating events such as sabotage and terrorism.’*
The “disastrous" release of the executive summary o f this report also excluded
any social considerations in calculating the risks imposed by nuclear reactors.’^ This
exclusion, along with other faults in the study forced the NRC to establish a review group
to look at the process o f risk assessment generally. This sparked interest in studying the
risks o f nuclear power. New studies began in the early 1980's and were often
underwritten by states who were potential nuclear waste repository sites. These studies
were similar to the RSS in that they hoped to influence public policy as their goal. These
studies differed from the RSS because they attempted to broaden the definition o f risk in
the hope that a new view o f risk would give affected parties greater say in the program.

92

Ibid.

’’ Golding and White, Guidelines on the Scope, Content, and Use o f Comprehensive Risk
Assessment in the Management o f High-Level Nuclear Waste Transportation 29.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment o f Accident
risks in Commercial Nuclear Power Plants.
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Like expert risk, democratic risk assessment has, as its goal, influence over public policy.

Democratic Risk Assessment
New studies of risk placed man at the center of the analysis and culminated in
Paul Slovic’s “psychometric model" o f risk.’* This model o f risk was developed using
sophisticated survey and statistical techniques to measure how people felt about risk, as
well as how they made comparisons between alternative risks. The studies found
signiflcant differences in the way people o f different ages, races, and genders evaluate
risk.

Slovic and his associates (notably James Flynn) attempted to show how risks are

perceived. The public evaluates and compares risk in a complex manner that could be
identified using public opinion surveys. His views closely follow Douglas’ and are
recognizable as a more reasonable model o f risk than the expert view. The expectation o f
democratic risk assessors is that if social scientists incorporated public sentiment into risk
assessment then progress was possible.’*
Portions o f the democratic view of risk have made important inroads in the policy
debate. In the fifteen years since the original studies were performed, survey research and
sampling have become mainstays in risk assessment.” The relevance of the public has

’* Paul Slovic and Mark Layman, Nancy Kraus, James Flynn, James Chalmers, and Gail
Gesell, “Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts o f a High-Level
Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada’’ Risk Analysis Vol. 11 No 4. (1989): 683-694.
’*lbid., 687.
” Hank Jenkins-Smith and Gilbert W. Bassett Jr. “Perceived risk and Uncertainty o f
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also found its way into risk assessment. A society to study risk has been formed and the
theoreticians once outside the mainstream o f risk assessment are now accepted members.
Even the DOE has tacitly adopted the view o f the democratic risk assessors by using
public opinion surveys along waste transportation corridors.’*
Risk assessment seems poised to make a huge leap forward in its functionality as
a public policy tool by using social science to study both the physical world and the
perceptions of the people. However, the introduction o f opinion surveys has failed to
make the public more receptive to the results of risk assessments. Retargeting
quantitative measures to people as well as things has not improved the policy
performance of risk assessment. The State o f Nevada remains firm in its opposition to
the proposed repository. Informal opposition groups have actually increased membership
after these tools were used.”
Despite hard-won acceptance, only portions o f democratic risk assessment have
found their way into the mainstream of discussion about transportation route selection.
Issues o f importance to democratic risk assessors such as: human factors analysis,
sabotage and terrorism are seldom incorporated. Indeed, it can be argued that the use of
democratic risk techniques are actually in decline. In 1984, the NRC promulgated

Nuclear Waste,” Risk Analysis vol. 14, No 5, (1994): 851-856.
’* Hank Jenkins Smith, Transporting Radioactive Materials presentation to the DOE’s
Transportation External Coordination Working Group. 19 January 1996.
” Kay Merriam, “Public Participation in Citizen’s Groups in Idaho,” interview by the
author, Boise, ID, 15 Sep. 1997.
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regulations which incorporated the threats o f terrorism and sabotage into the study o f
transporting HLW. In 1989 these regulations were withdrawn, because the “probability
o f that risk was negligible.”'®*
A major failing o f the democratic view o f risk has been that its proponents have
stopped short o f implementing their vision o f risk in a way that can be used by policy
makers. Unlike expert risk assessment, which was intentionally crafted to meet the needs
o f decision makers, democratic risk assessment does not have a methodology that can be
implemented in a way that produces reliable results. The variables considered by one
democratic risk assessor may not be used by another risk assessor working on a similar
project. Risk perception remains a highly controversial subject. A simple definition that
has observable results is not available. Numerous coimter examples exist that seem to
refute the idea of perceived risk."" For example, more people are using the land near
nuclear power plants for home sites."** It is not yet clear how risk perception or low
probability events can be integrated into any risk assessment. Essential things such as
standard terminology, best practices, and common epistemology have never been
developed for the democratic view o f risk.

'®* Robert Halstead, and James Ballard, Nuclear Waste Transportation Security and
Safety Issues unpublished report (Carson City, NV : Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office
1997) ix.
"*’ Metz, “Potential Negative Impacts o f Nuclear Activities on Local Economies:
Rethinking the Issue,” 771-772.
"** Metz, “Potential Negative Impacts of Nuclear Activities on Local Economies:
Rethinking the Issue” 765.
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Proponents o f democratic risk analysis remain too content to point out the failings
o f the expert risk assessment without providing a true alternative. This has enabled expert
risk assessors to exert control over the field by pointing to their contributions to
policymaking. The democratic view o f risk creates problems for decision makers, rather
than solving them. The expert risk assessors’ actuarial tables, mortality charts, and costbenefit analyses reign supreme and enable expert risk assessors to dismiss the democratic
view o f risk as mere politics. The close association of prominent democratic risk
assessors with opposition movements (notably nuclear waste) has leant credence to the
view that democratic risk analysis is merely a device to oppose impopular programs.

Comprehensive Risk Assessment
The single attempt to create an alternative to the Guidelines was funded by the
State o f Nevada.'”

This report. Guidelines on the Scope, Content, and Use o f

Comprehensive Risk Assessment in the Management o f High-Level Nuclear Waste
Transportation (hereafter referred to as CRA) was prepared for Nevada’s Nuclear Waste
Project Office by Dominic Golding and Allen White in December of 1990.'” The report
expressed the state's concerns about the relevance of sociological knowledge and is the
nearest application o f the democratic view of risk assessment developed in the
transportation field. The state report is noteworthy because it provides a blueprint for
applying the democratic view to risk assessment.

"** Golding and White, Guidelines on the Scope, Content, and Use o f Comprehensive Risk
Assessment in the Management o f High-Level Nuclear Waste Transportation, 9-23.
'” Ibid., 5-6
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The authors begin by highlighting limitations in expert risk assessment. They
believe that broadening the definitions o f risk and examining special situations would
successfully incorporate the concerns o f democratic risk assessors and the public.
However, a key component o f their report is that “No new basic methodology is needed,
but existing methods may have to be adapted or extended.” They believe the
epistemology o f expert risk assessment is valid - it need only be expanded to include the
social sciences.'”
The authors say that opening the process o f risk assessment to input from the
social sciences will encourage a comprehensive view o f risk assessment by enlarging the
definition o f the causes and the consequences of transportation hazards. They claim their
process will provide greater realism to risk estimates and yield results that are more
coincident with public sensibilities. They look at 1) initiating events, 2) consequences,
and 3) uncertainty as particularly fruitful areas for improvement.
By initiating events, the authors refer to events that cause accidents. They focus
on human error as a primary cause o f failure in complex technological systems. This is
consistent with findings in other transportation accident analyses.'” The authors also
denigrate expert risk analysis as a tool to understand low-probability, high-consequence
events such as terrorism, sabotage, and natural disasters. The authors believe that the
consequences o f accidents chosen by expert risk assessment are also very clear. As
105

Ibid., 5.

"** Department o f Transportation, Highway Routing o f Hazardous Materials, Guidelines
fo r Applying Criteria. (Wash DC: Department o f Transportation Nov 1996) P 41.
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alluded to above, the consequences o f a HLW transportation accident are a very
controversial subject. CRA would include: “economic losses; the costs o f emergency
planning and preparedness; the behavior of public officials and households under
emergency conditions; declining property values; psychological stress; and so forth.”'”
Another area in which CRA provides guidance is by acknowledging the uncertainty that
exists in transportation risk assessment. The authors say that this uncertainty arises
because of:
•
•
•
•
•

poor or inadequate data;
the choice o f models and assumptions;
the use of expert judgment as a substitute for poor or missing data;
the assumptions about human factors, and human and organizational errors; and,
human error in estimation techniques
CRA is consistent with the ideal o f democratic risk assessment because it

demands that greater attention be paid to non-radiological impacts and economic
consequences.'” The authors explicitly criticize the expert view of risk for using a narrow
definition of risk. They say a comprehensive risk assessment needs to address the
complete range o f events and consequences, and be able to accommodate a broader view
o f risk that is more compatible with that of the public."” They do not however, define
that broader view or how it can be implemented.

Application of Comprehensive Risk Assessment

'” Golding and White. 10.
Ibid., 4.
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Ibid., 4
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Unlike expert risk assessment, the democratic view o f risk is difficult to apply.
The primary reason expert risk assessments have gained such a hold in policy making can
partly be explained by the failure of the democratic view to produce a reliable alternative
to the expert view. CRA, unlike the Guidelines, contains no procedure for comparing
routes. The clear-cut numbers and equations of expert risk assessment are not available
in the democratic view.
The authors highlight and discuss in detail what goes wrong with expert
transportation risk assessments. They do not, however, show 1) how to measure the
variables they recommend including in their analysis and 2) how to integrate these
variables into a route comparison. This failure is a major handicap for democratic risk
assessment and occurs because democratic risk assessment is partly hostage to its
intellectual roots.
Douglas' comparison between our own society and that o f aboriginal tribes is
meant to demonstrate how difficult it is to argue that risk assessments are not derived
partly by cultural factors. The fact that the Hima’s and the Lele’s risk beliefs are
noteworthy is itself evidence of the cultural differences inherent in risk selection. This
logic provides an argument against democratic risk assessment. If it is impossible to
differentiate between risks because of cultural differences, then there is no basis for
comparing any risk assessments.
Mary Midgley’s analysis of cultural relativism (which she referred to as “moral
isolationism”) explains how it is possible to distinguish between policies despite the
possibility o f cultural bias. Her critique is relevant for the risk assessment because it
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illustrates the weakness o f the democratic argument. Midgley uses a non-controversial
example to show how it is possible to distinguish between a good and bad policy despite
the existence of cultural differences. The example she uses is the ancient Samurai custom
o f testing a new sword by killing a random passerby. Midgley argues that it is possible
to criticize this custom on a moral basis despite cultural distinctions. She describes how
it is difficult to do otherwise.
Midgley makes three pertinent criticisms o f the cultural relativist viewpoint.
First, she asks whether or not cultural bias should prevent praise as well as blame. The
work done on perceived risk is almost completely negative, in the sense that it is a
critique o f positivist method rather than an attempt to construct an alternative argument.
The proponents of democratic risk assessment showcase our fears and anxieties , but do
not replace them with anything. If their theories were balanced, then there should be
room for constructive effort rather than a wholly negative orientation.
Midgley's second question is: what is involved in judging? This is question
democratic risk assessors have not been prone to address. Only Paul Slovic, has
attempted to dissect and explain what variables constitute our fears.'" To date, no
democratic risk assessor has shown how these variables work together to produce fear.
This omission also fails to explain how counterexamples to the theory o f democratic risk

" “Mary Midgley, “Trying Out One’s New Sword.” Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life 2"'*
Ed. Christina Sommers and Fred Sommers, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989.
'" Paul Slovic, “Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy,” Risk Analysis Vol. 13No. 6
(1993): 675-682.
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occur and why they occur. The democratic position on risk ultimately “forbids us to form
any opinions on these matters. Its ground for doing so is that we don’t understand them.”
The democratic view of risk disarms any discussion of risk by rejecting the validity of
any process used to understand it.
The final question posed o f cultural relativism is: If we can’t judge other cultures
then how can we judge our own? The democratic view of risk suffers because it cannot
explain itself to itself. If risks are perceived according to culture, then how can we know
that. Perhaps there is no such thing as risk at all. Democratic risk assessment cannot
argue on its own behalf. These problems with the theory lead democratic risk assessment
into a “formless relativism” that ultimately kills any kind o f risk assessment as a policy
tool.
The problems raised by Midgley have not been addressed by either side o f the
debate. The expert risk assessors claim that any introduction of cultural factors will
inevitably lead no where, while democratic risk assessors have not shown they have the
stomach to do more than criticize the expert view of risk. Accepting the methods
proposed by CRA can create problems.
In order to judge the efficacy o f emergency measures, people living near two
nuclear power plants were surveyed. The survey found that 40% of the people living near
one nuclear power plant would evacuate based on an emergency message. The same
message played to the audience o f people living near a different power plant would cause
25% o f residents to evacuate. There are clear differences between the two populations,
however, democratic risk assessors have provided no insight as to how these differences
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can be reconciled. Democratic risk assessors argue that social and cultural factors must
be included in the discussion but do not say how.
The difficulty o f measuring economic effects is an example of the difficulties with
democratic risk assessment. Economic effects are measured in the Guidelines by the
cost to decontaminate buildings. This cost is relatively easy to measure if standard costs
are agreed upon. The definition of economic impacts used in the CRA is more
problematic. CRA recommends that economic effects o f transporting waste be measured
by the following variables: 1) economic losses; 2) the costs o f emergency planning and
preparedness; 3) the behavior o f public officials and households under emergency
conditions; 4) declining property values; 5) psychological stress. The authors airily claim
that these variables should be included but do not indicate how they should be measured
or how competing interests can be reconciled. Unlike the Guidelines, there is no clear-cut
definition o f impacts.
The first variable, economic losses, is difficult to forecast without any previous
accident experience for high level waste. Proponents of DOE's program argue that the
absence o f any accident history suggests that the economic effects will be slight.
However, the centerpiece o f the State o f Nevada’s argument in favor of selecting routes
that avoid Las Vegas is that shipping waste through Las Vegas would cause economic
losses. The State believes that the profitability o f the Casinos would be affected by the
fear caused by those shipments. There are others, however, who argue that there will be
no long term effects caused by the perceived fear o f the shipments. This contention is
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supported by the experience o f real estate appraisers."* CRA provides no method for
resolving this question and appears to assume that it would be simple to resolve.
The second variable, the cost o f emergency preparedness also presents definitional
problems. Emergency response capabilities must be tailored to an accident scenario.
However, there will be legitimate dispute about what kind of accident the local
responders will have to cope with. People with their eyes on the budget will favor
historical accident rates which suggest that virtually no radiation will ever leak. The
people living along the routes may demand a higher standard o f training. Once more,
CRA possesses no mechanism to resolve this dispute.
Preparing a forecast o f the costs incurred by public behavior is also very difficult.
The risk assessment profession is wrestling with the program of predicting low
probability, high consequence accidents—such as a radiation spill from a transportation
cask- the discipline has not developed to the extent that it is capable of an even more
sophisticated appraisal of what would be the cost o f the public's response to such an
accident.
The negative impact transporting waste may have on land values remains hotly
contested. The likely costs o f psychological stress are a similar challenge. Both
problems are open to abuse. Expert risk assessors have chosen to exclude any
consideration o f these costs. There is little chance o f obtaining agreement on these costs.

"* Johnny Vaught, ex-officio President o f International Right of Way Association,
“Effect of Perceived Risk on Appraised Real Estate Prices,” interview by the author, 12
January, 1997. Paul Slovic, “Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy,” Risk Analysis Vol.
13No. 6(1993): 675-682.
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There are undoubtedly other variables that could be used in place o f or in addition to
those proposed in the CRA. CRA does not provide any insight into how to operationalize
these variables. The democratic view o f risk assessment is tied to the use o f the social
sciences as a means of integrating the facts and values. Fischer's framework highlights
the deeper flaws in the democratic argument.

Fischer’s Framework Applied to Democratic Risk Assessment
Fischer’s framework illustrates both the shortcomings and benefits o f CRA. It
does so in a way that points the way to the new requirements for risk assessment.
I.

Program Verification

At the first level of Fischer’s framework, the democratic view o f risk (as
exemplified by a comprehensive risk assessment) must answer these questions:
a) Does the program fulfill the stated objectives?
b) Does the analysis uncover secondary or unanticipated effects?
c) Does the program fulfill the stated objectives better than another?
CRA does not fulfill its objectives because it does not make clear how the
recommendations contained in the report can be applied. The report itself is a series o f
recommendations for improving existing expert techniques. The democratic view o f risk
expands the scope o f expert risk assessment to include the concerns o f the public,
however, in practical terms it also becomes incomprehensible and unmanageable.
Another problem is that CRA admits it builds on the Guidelines; it embraces the
procedures contained in the Guidelines and merely supplements by widening the
definition o f risk. As a result, it incorporates the problems o f the Guidelines (and o f
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expert risk assessment) without resolving them.
CRA creates unanticipated consequences that make its practical implementation
doubtful. The CRA process is highly ideographic in that the results of one route
assessment are unlikely to be successfully applied to another route. The democratic view
o f risk relies heavily on survey research to reach its conclusions. Virtually all o f the
perceived risk literature is the reportage and interpretation of survey results."* Public
opinion surveys conducted along alternate routes will be unreliable and open to dispute.
Survey questions may be asked along a transportation route, but the respondents
and conditions in the route can change, negating the persuasive ability o f the analysis.
Questions may be answered based on self-interest or ignorance. The data is also
perishable and subject to manipulation. A well-funded agency could implement an
advertising campaign prior to a survey that would skew the results o f the survey.
Proponents o f DOE’s program routinely dismiss the result of surveys sponsored by the
State o f Nevada.'" The example cited above of the difference in response likelihood
varied between locations near nuclear power plants. CRA contains no plan to integrate
data developed by social sciences with the data developed by statisticians and

"* See articles on perceived risk especially: Paul Slovic and Mark Layman, Nancy
Kraus, James Flynn, James Chalmers, and Gail Gesell, “Perceived Risk, Stigma, and
Potential Economic Impacts of a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada” Risk
Analysis Vol. 11 No 4. (1989): 683-694; Hank Jenkins-Smith and Gilbert W. Bassett Jr.
“Perceived risk and Uncertainty of Nuclear Waste,” Risk Analysis vol. 14, No 5, (1994):
851-856 and Paul Slovic, James Flynn, and Robin Gregory “Stigma Happens: Social
Problems in the Siting o f Nuclear Waste Facilities,” Risk Analysis 14, (1994): 773-777
and Douglas Easterling and Howard Kunreuther, The Dilemma o f Siting a High-Level
Nuclear Waste Repository, (Boston: Kluwer 1995).
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transportation engineers.
The survey method o f measurement used by Slovic in his psychometric paradigm
is open to question and assault. Relying on polls as the basis for selecting routes is a
difficult endeavor. It presents ethical problems that are beyond solution. Foremost
among these is the tyranny o f the majority. By using the opinions of the majority o f the
respondents, the democratic risk assessor forecloses the rights o f the minority
respondents. Areas that are well informed about problems of nuclear waste may express
greater indignation at shipping campaigns. They can arrange to avoid transportation of
waste through their areas. Using polling data as a guide to understanding public
perceptions about shipping HLW, as has been done by the DOE,"* raises the question not
just o f whether or not the public is informed but how uniformly the information is
distributed among affected parties. Areas with access to better information about the issue
will naturally be better at avoiding route selections that effect them. Nevada is an
example o f how a sophisticated policy infrastructure already exists that can compare and
select between routes. Nevada’s expertise poses problems for its neighbors who do not
have the same degree o f sophistication.
There is little evidence that CRA is a better empirical tool than the Guidelines. A
major criticism of expert risk assessment is that its definition of risk is too narrow.

Metz, “Potential Negative Impacts o f Nuclear Activities on Local Economies:
Rethinking the Issue” 765.
"* Hank Jenkins Smith, Transporting Radioactive Materials presentation to the DOE’s
Transportation External Coordination Working Group. 19 January 1996.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

83
Although CRA requires that the "full range o f initiating events be evaluated""* there is no
indication o f what the full range of events is or who will decide what are those events.
The Guidelines suffer from too narrow a definition of risk, CRA suffers from no
definition o f risk. The consequence of this limitation is that necessary methodological
assumptions are just as uncertain in CRA as they are for the Guidelines. People affected
by high-level waste transportation can infinitely broaden the effects of transport. The
proponents o f shipping can argue equally forcefully that any definition is too narrow.
Given the procedures in CRA, it will be impossible to arrive at consensus about even the
most basic questions. CRA does not provide a viable alternative.
At this level of Fischer’s analysis, CRA cannot claim to make a better comparison
than the Guidelines. CRA must provide a more persuasive and convincing analysis than
the Guidelines for it to be used as a substitute. Proponents o f comprehensive risk
assessment have only suggested a process that confuses the issue. CRA merely enlarges
the amount o f data collected without improving the meaning o f the data collected. CRA's
performance as a policy tool improves at the next level o f evaluation
2.

Situational Validation

At this level of analysis, CRA is subjected to three questions:
a. Is the program relevant to the problem situation?
b. Are there circumstances that require exceptions to be made?
c. Are two or more criteria better applied to the problem?

116 Golding and White, Guidelines on the Scope, Content, and Use o f Comprehensive
Risk Assessment in the Management o f High-Level Nuclear Waste Transportation , 7.
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The first answer is that CRA is certainly relevant to the problem solution.
However, the problem for CRA is that it is not m ore applicable to the problem of route
selection than the Guidelines. Some of the limitations o f the Guidelines are not present in
CRA. The methodological reforms recommended in CRA make it a more relevant
choice than the Guidelines. However, the limitation with CRA is that although it
recognizes these problems it does not adequately address them. There is no clear cut
description of how routes can be compared by CRA. There is no process for examining
the routes. There is no way to distinguish or compare between routes. In terms of
comparing routes, the Guidelines remain unscathed by CRA's criticisms because CRA
provides no alternative methodology.
In this case CRA fails because there are no rules by which exceptions to the route
selection can be made. CRA's guidance is so broad that it does not provide any basis for
comparing routes, or treating routes differently from one route to another. This leads to
the answer to the third question at this level. The CRA is internally inconsistent. This
inconsistency appears because CRA has broadened the discussion to the point that, for
example, any evaluation o f risk is just as good as any other. The absence o f any
structural limits to the definition o f risk means that is impossible to distinguish between
competing risk claims o f hazard.
CRA fails to provide risk assessors with any basis for comparing route selection
criteria. An example o f this occurs in the selection o f accident rates. Even the Guidelines
propose seven different accident rates. CRA does not provide an empirical rule that
could be used to choose between accident rates. The accident rate finally chosen for a
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route selection could be calibrated to any one o f several statistics. CRA provides no help
in choosing between the competing claims and any set o f criteria may be as sufficient.
At the second level o f evaluation, the CRA contains grand ideas and sentiments
but does not provide any method of operationalizing them. The advocates o f perceived
risk have leveled telling criticisms, but provided nothing new. The second level of policy
evaluation supports the assertion that CRA is more a collection of opinions than a true
alternative to the Guidelines.

3.

Societal Vindication

The third level o f Fischer’s framework moves from the "concrete situational
context to the societal system as a whole." At this level the CRA begins to perform better
than the Guidelines. It demonstrates a sensitivity to the full implications of shipping
high-level waste. At this level the questions asked are:
a) Does the policy contribute to society as a whole?
b) Does the policy goal result in unanticipated problems with important societal
consequences?
c) Does a commitment to the policy goal lead to consequences that are inequitably
distributed?
CRA answers these questions better than the Guidelines because it allows the
analysis to incorporate concern for the problems faced by affected parties. A CRA
conducted as described in the document would be more attentive to society’s needs than
the Guidelines. The parties affected would have a greater chance to have their voices
heard and an examination o f the full impacts o f the decision would be performed. But
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problems for CRA arise at this level.
CRA introduces social science into the problems of risk assessment. The
psychometric profile used to define perceived risk is an example of how social science
can speak to problems o f risk policy. However, the failure of CRA is the same as for the
expert view risk, it fails to see that differences in the measurement of risk will become be
manifested as political rather than technical issues. Even though the tools o f social
science may be incorporated into risk assessment, the same drawback exists—these tools
do not bring political legitimacy. The technocratic model of decision making is as
inadequate when done by social scientific technocrats as when it is done by engineers.
The consequences o f using CRA are also impossible to distribute equitably. Poll
results, survey tools and qualitative methods cannot yield a uniformly equitable answer.
In selecting routes one route must be chosen and someone must lose. There are
mechanisms for compensating the losers in these discussions, however, these
mechanisms only manifest themselves in a political atmosphere rather than through social
science.
4. Social Choice
At first glance, democratic risk assessment appears to be a sufficient remedy for
the drawbacks o f expert risk assessment. As it is applied, however, it is insufficient for
the same reasons. At the highest level o f Fischer’s analysis, the following questions are
relevant:
a) Do the fundamental ideals (or ideology) that organize the accepted social order
provide a basis for legitimate resolution of conflicting judgments?
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b) If the social order is unable to resolve basic value conflicts, do other social orders
equally prescribe for the relevant interests and needs that the conflicts reflect?
c) Do normative reflection and empirical evidence support the justification and adoption
o f alternative ideology and the social order it prescribes?
Democratic risk assessors clearly see the problems with the expert view o f risk
assessment and still fall prey to them in practice. If risk assessment will deserve to play a
role in public policy, it must be successful in winning public support. The fundamental
ideals o f the democratic risk assessors are sound. Aaron Wildavsky prominently argued
that risk is political and can only be accessed by political understanding. However, that
insight has not been incorporated into the everyday practice o f risk assessment.
The democratic view o f risk is closer to providing a legitimate basis for resolving
policy conflicts than the expert view. The use o f sophisticated statistical techniques and
carefully worded polls has failed to reconcile Nevadans to a nuclear waste repository.
The results of polls and focus groups have not enabled DOE to move radioactive wastes
without controversy. These tools have been useful in understanding the character and
depth o f concern, but they have not proven to be a successful substitute. In practice,
democratic risk assessors appear to know that risk is political, but choose to behave as
though public opinion polls can substitute for political engagement. Democratic risk
assessment can claim that its heart is in the right place. However, its brain has yet to
follow.
The evidence from other activities continues to support the argument that slightly
modified procedures can improve risk assessment so that technical analysis conforms
more closely to the objectives o f the people affected by the hazards posed. As currently
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articulated by the CRA. democratic risk assessment is unable to resolve value conflicts.
Instead, the public is treated to more o f the same and the application o f expert knowledge
threatens the political system. However, as was to be expected, the response to
technological uncertainty has spawned a number of new approaches to the problem o f
empowering the public to make decisions about technological risk.

Summary
In this chapter, democratic risk assessment was described. This view sees risk as
a more complex phenomenon than the expert view of risk. Risk is impossible to
understand outside some cultural context. This context shapes the technical analysis—and
the risk chosen to analyze. A major drawback of the democratic view o f risk is that it has
adopted the epistemology o f the expert view. As it is implemented in CRA. it accepts the
problems o f expert risk assessment while merely broadening the definition o f risk.
Fisher’s framework shows that the problem as to who chooses the risks studied and how
they are studied are political problems that cannot be addressed with the procedures and
tools currently in place. In Chapter 4 a new process for performing risk assessments will
be described. This process empowers the public to affect the technical program. It is
built on the successful efforts o f other disciplines and derives its strength not from
technical merit but from political legitimacy.
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CHAPTER 4
A New Process for Risk Assessment

Neither o f the current approaches to risk assessment is adequate to provide
guidance on comparing and selecting routes because both worlds o f risk assessment
create abstract models that are unconnected to the people affected by the risk. Easily
recognized methodological problems conceal the anti-democratic world view o f expert
risk assessment. The democratic view o f risk musters the same methods of expert risk
assessors to identify the fears o f affected populations but does not empower affected
parties. In the context o f selecting routes for transporting HLW, the two approaches to
risk assessment are primarily distinguished by the undergraduate training o f the risk
assessors. This chapter summarizes the fundamental dilemma o f risk assessment,
provides a brief critique of risk communication, describes how the profession of
transportation planning has handled similar problems, and provides a new route
comparison process emphasizes a legitimate process as an important goal.

Risk Assessment’s Dilemma
The National Research Council’s committee on risk described the essential
problem o f risk assessment when it said: “detailed scientific and technical information is
essential for understanding risks and making wise decisions about them, yet the people
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responsible for understanding risk and the people affected by the decisions and who may
therefore also take part in them are not themselves expert in the relevant science and
technology.""'
This dilemma suggests that route comparison guidelines for high level waste
transport must serve audiences usually excluded from risk assessments. The members of
the public affected by risk are seldom able to influence the study design or interpret the
results o f risk assessments. This points to effective reforms of risk assessment. Any
reform must meet two conditions: reliability and validity.
The problem o f reliability is significant. Transporting high level waste will
inevitably cause iniquities due to the spatial distribution of routes and the methodological
uncertainties caused by limitations on our ability to collect and manipulate knowledge
about the world. Affected cities have vested interests in the methodological assumptions
embedded in risk assessments. Any new process will have to cope with methodological
uncertainty while still producing routes that are not arbitrary. The route selection must be
the necessary' conclusion o f some deductive process in order for it to be other than the
result of arbitrary political power. It must also be perceived that way by affected parties.
Any route comparison must apply the same criterion to alternate routes in the
same way. The criterion used in the analysis cannot solve the methodological
uncertainties inherent in risk assessment. Instead a reliable process seeks to achieve a
uniform evaluation o f each route. Cost benefit analysis has had a similar experience.

‘' Stem, Understanding Risk. P2.
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The initial claims for cost benefit analysis were similar to those made by expert risk
assessors."* Cost-benefit analysis could “prove’' one alternate was better than another.
After numerous failures, cost-benefit analysts beat a hasty retreat to the current practice
that merely attempts to apply their techniques in a uniform way."’
Absolute proof is not the standard for route comparison. Instead mere uniformity
is the goal. One methodological reform suggested is that data used in route selections be
calibrated to observed data. Shrader-Frechette recommends calibrating expert opinion.
Rather than calibrate risk assessors, it would be more productive to calibrate input data.
This is not to suggest that past accident rates (for example) would be perfect predictors.
Comparing past accident rates to averages would provide a basis for choosing which
accident rate is most appropriate. The problem o f reliability is important but it is not the
central question. The challenge is not in how to apply criteria uniformly. The challenge
is. what criteria are relevant to legitimacy o f the route selection?

Legitimacy
The other condition the selection process must meet is that affected parties
perceive it to be legitimate. Research into risk perception suggests that actual estimates

' ’* Department o f Transportation. Guidelines fo r the Use o f Cost Benefit Analysis in
Evaluating Roadway Improvement Alternatives. (Wash. DC: GPO, 1994).
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o f probability do not vary much between experts and laymen, however, the philosophical
position behind interpreting the results varies greatly."’
The affected public considers human motivation in its risk assessment while
technical risk assessors excluded human motivation. Social values play a part in risk
assessment. Slovic cites the importance o f trust."' He points to the lack o f trust as a
cause of the decline in public confidence in the management o f technological hazards.
Despite the adoption o f risk assessment techniques as a regulatory tool, there is little
evidence those technical information changes public opinion.
Creating trust is difficult to do and easy to lose. In policy making there is a bias
in favor of distrust because: trust-destroying events are more visible, they carry more
weight, and sources of bad news are more credible than sources o f good news. Distrust
lingers by inhibiting contacts that would encourage trust. Risk has a component that is
philosophical. The people affected by any risk perceive it differently based on its
voluntariness or on the kind o f risk.
The major flaw in Chauncey Starr’s 1969 article is that he failed to distinguish
between individual and group risks. He equated the risks accepted by individuals (for
example, mountain climbing) with risks that are borne or imposed by society as a whole

Karl Dake, and Aaron Wildavsky. “Individual Differences in Risk Perception and
Risk-Taking Preferences.” The Analysis, Communication and Perception o f Risk ed. B.J.
Garrick and W. C. Gekler, (New York: Plenum Press 1991) 76.
Slovic, “Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy,” 679-682.
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(for example, w ar).'" Research has shown that people perceive differences in risks based
on their voluntariness and scale.

An individual who chooses mountain climbing as a

hobby has accepted a risk qualitatively different from the person who lives near a route
designated to carry high level waste by the Federal government.
The difference between these risks demands higher standards for trust on the part
o f the agency implementing the program imposing the risks. For route selection to be
legitimate, it must possess three characteristics:
1. The affected parties must be fully informed o f the route selection proposed and the
process used to compare the routes.
2. The affected parties must have the ability to participate in the route selection process.
That is the route selection must not be finalized without input from affected parties.
3. How the input from the public will be used to shape decisions must also be decided
upon.
4. Affected parties must be compensated for losses based on the damage inflicted by the
shipping campaign.
Incorporating legitimacy into risk assessment drastically changes how risk
assessments are performed. In performing other duties, the DOE has strictly hew n to the
letter of their governing regulations rather than making a genuine attempt to solicit
information from the affected parties. The DOE has been accused o f adopting a “Decide
.Announce Defend” strategy that excludes the public.

The DOE makes decisions.

Starr, “Social Benefit versus Technological Risk,” 1234-1239.
Slovic, “Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy,” 678-679.
Judy Treichel. “Comments on DOE’s Public Participation Plans” interview with the
author. Las Vegas, NV 13 January, 1997.
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announces its program and desperately fights criticism of their program in an attempt to
retain its credibility in the face o f glaring errors or omissions. The process contained in
the Guidelines is consistent with Decide Announce Defend because it gives artificially
significant status to the mandatory factors whose value is open to dispute. A new
process is needed to address this problem.
DOE officials have dismissed public involvement as a meaningless distraction."^
They argue that because public meetings are often acrimonious and few members o f the
public participate, there is little relevance in the process. The DOE officials have a point.
Too often meetings decay into meandering discussions of trivial issues. The DOE
appears to suffer fi-om an inability to effectively obtain and efficiently use public input.
There is also a poor attitude evinced by many senior DOE managers , which suggests that
they arrive at public meetings unwilling to receive any meaningful input. Another
reason the DOE derives little benefit from its public meetings is because it has fallen prey
to the distraction created by the field of risk communication. Risk communication is
important because it has not only failed, but also it has caused its clients to think they
were succeeding when just the opposite was the case.

The Risk Communication Failure
The study o f risk communication was inaugurated by comments made by the first

Bruce Stolte, “Comments on the Public’s Role in Policy Decision Making,” interview
with the author. Las Vegas, NV 14 March, 1997.
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administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. William Ruckelshaus."’ In 1985
he gave a speech that indicated that the procedures contained in the National
Environmental Policy Act had failed to provide the desired results. He argued that the
public did not understand the technical aspects o f environmental assessments and that a
new discipline was required to successfully transfer technical knowledge to laypeople.
Sadly, his proposal has been institutionalized by the creation o f the field o f risk
communication. Risk commimication imparts technical information about risk
assessments to lay people. The t>'pical risk communication project consists of a bulk
presentation o f technical knowledge to steering committees, panels and the public. Risk
communication is used as an intermediate step between the calculation o f the risk and the
determination o f whether or not the risk was acceptable. The basis for risk
communication studies is that the public is rational about using technical information and
that technical information will be used the in same way by both the public and risk
assessors use it. Risk communication expects to repackage the technical data and present
it to the public."’ Providing more information (even interpreted information) misses the
point.
Risk communication shares with expert risk assessment the idea that increasing
rationality on the part o f the public will increase their willingness to accept the risk, that

William Ruckelshaus. “Risk Science, and Democracy.” Issues in Science and
Technology, V ol.1, No. 3 (Spring 1985): 19-38.
Branden B. Johnson, and Paul Slovic. “’Improving’ Risk Communication and Risk
Management: Legislated Solutions or Legislated Disasters?” Risk Analysis Vol. 14, No.
6,(1994): 905-906.
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“if only the public would understand this stuff isn’t so bad." It does not admit that there
may be a different kind o f reasoning invoked when problems of public safety are
concerned.
Risk communication was specifically developed to act as the servant o f the
agency funding the assessment rather than the people affected by the program being
assessed. As a result, it is often little more than a public affairs activit)' struggling in the
shadow of the assessors. Risk communication has results akin to guerrilla war. After
appointing countless steering committees and advisory boards, the risk communicators
win battles by converting the members o f the boards but lose wars because their
battlefield victories do not persuade the affected public."*

The Public and Risk
Although it is valid to inform the public about risk assessment, it is fatally flawed
because it does not have legitimacy as a major goal. This is a substantial weakness in its
approach. Studies have shown that opponents o f technical programs are seldom
convinced by additional technical information."’ Instead, opponents of programs use the
information obtained from risk assessors to attack the assessment itself. Additional
information is used to identify weaknesses in assumptions, data and models, all at the
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" ’ Johnson, “’Improving" Risk Communication and Risk Management: Legislated
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expense of the risk assessment."’ The vocabulary of risk assessment is itself inarticulate
as to how risk assessment is finally a political judgement.
Although the political nature o f risk was understood by Douglas and Wildavsky
when they first described the cultural aspect o f risk, subsequent study of the cultural
dimensions of risk has failed to recognize risk assessment as a discipline rooted in
politics. In practice, both expert and democratic risk assessors have fallen into frenzy of
academic activity that does not help craft public policy because it is not connected to
political requirements.
Risk communication cannot make any meaningful inroads in swaying popular
opinion because it begins with the premise o f the public as audience instead o f the public
as policy maker. The technicians calculate some “risk” which is distributed in some
way. The technicians assume they are correct and that their view of risk is shared by the
people affected by their calculations. Fischer’s framework points out that larger questions
about our society play a role in policy making. For example, what kind o f society do we
want to live in? Research into risk assessment shows that the general public is very
aware o f the larger implications o f technical programs. Research supports the argument
that the public examines policy from a perspective analogous to Fischer’s third and fourth
levels rather than at the lower levels. The public is aware of its technical limitations and
seldom steps over these boundaries. However, the public is acutely aware o f its place in
the hierarchy o f institutions that effect it.

!30

Stem. Understanding Risk, P 32.
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People make decisions about personal risks similar to the empirical reasoning
found at the base o f Fischer's typology, but they base decisions about group risks using
the political reasoning fotmd at the higher levels o f Fischer's typology. Empirical
reasoning is sufficient to explain an individual’s perceptions of the world, but when asked
to reason for the group, he uses a different set o f rules. The new set o f rules establish
personal standards o f legitimacy for a given program. How can the problem be resolved?
Little previous research on risk has attempted to draw on analogous experience. One
field in particular —transportation planning —provides an invaluable model o f how to
build a successful route selection process.

Transportation Planning
The dilemma posed by risk assessment is familiar to transportation planners. The
transportation professionals that advise local government leaders (e.g. transportation
engineers, and plarmers) share epistemology with the positivist risk assessors. However,
experience has taught them to make their technical reasoning subservient to their political
masters. The need to somehow incorporate political reasoning into technical discussion
highlights the sterility o f the competing views of risk assessment. The uninflected views
o f expert risk assessors make them simple targets for democratic risk assessors. But
democratic risk assessors stopped short o f creating a meaningful multi-dimensional
approach and settled for a bigger version of expert risk assessment.
In attempting to make public policy, risk assessors have either attempted to
exclude the public (the expert view) or to reduce the public to a guinea pig (the
democratic view). Neither attempts to embrace the political arrangements and institutions
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that are part and parcel o f making policy. The approaches to risk assessment more
closely reflect the sectarian views of their proponents than the people who will be
affected by the risk.
A more fruitful approach may be foimd in the practice o f transportation planning.
There are numerous similarities between transporting hazardous materials and
transportation planning. Transportation planning grew out o f the field o f civil
engineering. The engineering studies that began in the 1930's were sufficient to design
roads and bridges, but were not sufficient to choose the locations where roads should be
built. As a result, the separate discipline of transportation planning evolved in the 1950's.
This was strongly supported by the Federal Interstate Highway Act o f 1954 which opened
the doors for vast construction projects.
These projects were frequently destructive. They ruined neighborhoods and
intruded into cherished and vulnerable places. Over time, initially hesitant public protest
grew into a fury. The Long Beach Freeway is a classic case in point. The fi-eeway was
first proposed in 1949. The project was necessary to acconunodate booming Los Angeles
and was suitable from a technical viewpoint. However, to make the freeway a reality, the
demolition of an historic area was necessary. Public protest about the proposal ensued,
and as o f 1998 the freeway had still not been com pleted."’
Proficient transportation planning practitioners now understand the need for an
extensive public involvement process. They understand the need to bring the issue before
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the public in order to get their approval and support. An advantage possessed by local
transportation planners is that the lines of authority and accountability are very clear; the
DOE does not currently possess this advantage. The author personally witnessed a senior
DOE official attempt to draw a flowchart describing the process used by DOE to select
routes for low level waste transportation. After numerous attempts, he was unable to
explain how, where and by whom a decision was made."*
Local elected officials are imable to dodge their responsibility. They, in turn, hold
transportation planners accountable for the responsible exercise o f their authority. This
perspective is consistent with the ideals espoused by democracy and is incompatible with
the way risk assessment is currently practiced. Changes in the practice of transportation
planning were institutionalized by the Federal Highway Act o f 1970 which mandated
certain public involvement techniques and formalized the need to incorporate public
concern.'" These institutional changes are embodied in the DOT’s Public Involvement
Techniques fo r Transportation Decision M aking}^ Regularly produced by DOT, the
manual establishes nationwide standards on how to involve the public in the most
effective way. The manual does not mention “effective communication.” Instead the
emphasis is on meaningful intentions. The five Guidelines in the forward of the manual

Frank diSanza, “DOE’s Decision Making Chain o f Command,” interview by the
author. Las Vegas, NV, 2 May, 1997.
Department o f Transportation, Public Involvement Techniques fo r Transportation
Decision Making (Wash DC: US Dept, o f Transportation 1996) XI.
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sum up the difference between the role o f the public in risk assessment and transportation
planning. 135
•

Acting in accord with basic democratic principles

•

Continuous contact between agency and non-agency people throughout transportation
decision-making

•

Use a variety of public involvement techniques

•

Active outreach to the public

•

Focus participation on decisions.
The way the Department o f Transportation defines democratic decision making is

especially useful in the context o f risk assessment:
Acting in accord with democratic principles means that
public involvement is more than simply following legislation and
regulations. In a democratic society, people have opportimities to
debate issues, fiame alternative solutions, and affect final decisions
in ways that respect the roles o f decision makers. Knowledge is
the basis of such participation. The public needs to know details
about a plan or project to evaluate its importance or anticipated
costs and benefits.
Agency goals reflect community goals.
Through continued interaction with the entire conununity, agencies
build community support and, more importantly, assure that the
public has the opportunity to help shape the substance of plans and
projects. In summary the public agencies act as public servants."’

The incorporation o f these beliefs into transportation planning suggests that the
positivist training of transportation planners and engineers has not survived contact with
the realties imposed by the public. Unlike risk assessment, however, which has gone
underground, transportation planners were forced to change their behavior in a way that

Ibid., 3-4.
" ’ Ibid., 1-2.
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would more effectively capture public concerns. This philosophy represents an effective
blend o f technical political imderstanding.
Another indication o f the how important public involvement is to transportation
planners can be found in the budgeting for large projects. Large transportation studies
typically budget 10% o f their funds to ensure the public is fully aware o f the implications
o f an impending project. For multimillion dollar projects, public involvement is a huge
portion of the budget. Engineering firms keep specialists on staff whose whole job is to
assist engineers and planners in receiving public input. Most importantly, the public is
recognized as a key assistant in making decisions about technical matters. A new risk
assessment process will incorporate the public in an intimate way.

The Recommended Process
This section will describe a new process for performing a risk assessment for
comparing radioactive waste routes. This process operates within the constraints imposed
by the NWPAA. It assumes that the waste will be stored in a single facility. The current
national disposal program imposes greater challenges on the route selection process. The
recommended risk assessment process is performed in the following steps:
1.

Use public involvement techniques to define the risk and choose criteria to
measure the risk created by transporting radioactive waste.

2.

Calculate the probability and the consequences of the hazards that are o f concern
to the public

3.

Identify mitigating measures and costs

4.

Present the results to the public and make programmatic adjustments as needed.
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The process is implemented in the following steps:
1.

Use public involvement techniques to define the risk and choose criteria to

measure the risk created by transporting radioactive waste. The alternative routes must
also be identified. This makes it possible to identify affected parties and to collect data
necessary to characterize the route. Once this is complete, focus groups, polls, citizens
juries and other tools can be used to define the risk and select criteria.
This step requires extensive public meetings and consultation to make it possible to arrive
at some agreement. It is important to point out that this is performed before the data
collection begins.
This ensures that the data collected is correct. The National Research Council
calls this “getting the science right.” " ’ One problem in this stage is which experts are
suitable. A trend in the nuclear waste industry appears to be the over-use o f nuclear
physicists. This may not be appropriate, depending on what are the public concerns.
Experts study the things in which they are expert. The public concerns must be
connected with the right experts.
In transportation planning the solution to this problem is to provide the public
with the universe o f possible alternatives and to study only those alternatives found to be
publicly acceptable. A key feature o f this step is the need to restrict the variables
considered by the risk assessment. Failure to do so will doom the assessment to
irrelevance. Too much data cannot be processed or understood by the public or even the
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experts themselves. Even an arbitrar>’ limit, perhaps 10 data items may be sufficient to
compete this step. For example, a committee formed from affected parties could select
three transportation-related variables (e.g. annual average daily traffic, fatal truck
accident rate and speed) as discriminating variables. Another committee could select
public health variables (e.g. daytime population, special populations, enviroiunentally
sensitive areas). A third committee could choose variables related to emergency response
(e.g. the location o f emergency response crews, the time required to reach an accident
scene, and the likely type o f accident). A final group could choose an economic variable
(such as the contribution o f the MSA to the general fund of the relevant state). Once
these variables were identified, methodological problems can be resolved prior to using
them in route selection. The intent is to establish the rules of the game before the play
begins.
Risk assessment must focus not on the results of the assessment, but rather on the
process used to arrive at the final assessment. An additional consideration is the need to
identify how affected parties get that way. A long-standing dispute in nuclear waste
transportation is whether or not people living adjacent to the routes will lose property
value due to the fear created by the transportation campaign."* The process o f identifying
these issues must be far reaching and detailed enough to provide a good representation of
public concern as well as a convincing mechanism for the compensation and
indemnification of affected parties.

"* Metz, “Potential Negative Impacts o f Nuclear Activities on Local Economies:
Rethinking the Issue.” 765.
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This process must be undertaken by an agency completely and visibly accountable
to elected officials. A clear chain of command is necessary in order for the project to
have the needed credibilit>\ It is likely that new data will have to be collected. Public
concerns are unlikely to fit into existing fi-ameworks for collecting data. For example,
sensitive populations are currently defined as nursing home residents, school children and
hospital patients. The public may wish to broaden or narrow that definition. If so,
current data may not be sufficient to describe the corridor.
2.

Calculate the probability and the consequences o f the hazards that are o f

concern to the public. This step conforms to what the National Research Council has
called “getting the science right.”"’ Once affected parties have agreed to how routes will
be evaluated, then technicians can move on to calculate the most effective way to
measure the probabilities and hazards. At this step the technical expert makes meaningful
contributions.
The author has had personal experience with a similar study in which an
arrangement of this kind was used successfully."’ In comparing routes for low level
radioactive waste transportation, affected parties were assembled and persuaded to agree
to the process that would be used to study the routes. Three criteria were chosen and the
methodological problems o f measuring and collecting data about the routes were resolved

" ’ Paul Stem, Speaking before the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Pahrump
Nevada. 22 October, 1996.
" ’ Department of Energy. Nevada Test Site Intermodal Transportation Facility Site and
Routing Evaluation Study. (Las Vegas: DOE, 1997).
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by obtaining agreement from the affected parties. In this way. the study was able to
proceed unaffected by empirical concerns.
The situation was akin to a game. Desperate enemies were persuaded to play the
game by certain rules that were imderstood to be flawed. However, by agreeing to
participate in the study they risked having to accept results they did not want. The same
procedure should be used in transporting HLW. This is the best way to obtain both
methodical agreement and legitimacy imparted by public participation.
3.

Identify Mitigation Measures and Costs. Once the severity o f the impacts has

been measured, it is possible to make the systems effected by the transportation more
responsive and resilient in the face o f risks. This was the cornerstone o f Mary Douglas’
conclusions. She argued that avoiding risk was impossible and therefore it is more
productive to develop systems that can recover from accidents than it is to chop logic
about risk measurements.
In HLW transportation, this means developing an assessment o f the impacts and
then deciding whether to mitigate them through improving system performance (e.g.,
emergency management) or paying compensation for unavoidable impacts. This is a step
that DOE is hesitant to take because o f the potential price tag. However, facing the
consequences early in the program is more realistic than pretending the costs will not be
worsened by delaying decisions about impacts.
4. Present the results to the public and make adjustments to the program. Once the
assessment has been prepared it must be presented to the public. This should not be done
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through a formal risk communication process. Rather, it should be done through existing
political structures and aggressive public involvement. It is likely that aggressive public
involvement coupled with changes to the program based on public comment will be
sufficient to allay most public criticism.
Even the most aggressive public involvement process will fail to allay all
criticism. There will inevitably be inequities in selecting routes for HLW transportation.
It is inevitable that not all of the people affected by the transportation will be satisfied.
The process described above does not purport to disarm all criticism. It does, however,
aim to achieve legitimacy by informing the people affected by the program and by
offering compensation to those inevitably affected by the program.

Comments on the Proposed Process
The process suggested above relies on a political model of reasonableness that is
adapted from both the democratic and the expert views of risk. Fischer’s framework
describes how political reasoning is introduced into policy making. The model proposed
in this chapter has advantages because it avoids methodological disputes by obtaining
prior agreement to the study. It confers legitimacy by placing the public firmly in charge
o f the assessment. Ultimately it enables the courts to be the final arbiter o f the route
selection. In the case o f nuclear waste, the issue is abstruse and the implications are
unlikely to appear urgent to a distracted public. As a result, participation in nuclear waste
forums will undoubtedly remain sparse.
A weakness of the above process is that risk assessments may be unduly
influenced by the activities o f small groups concerned about the issue. However, this may
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not be as great a problem because as Michael Kraft learned, the public is more concerned
about the wq>' decisions are made than they are about the end result."' This process fits
with that insight. This involvement process is aggressive in that it does not rely on the
public to make some effort to attend public meetings or to express concerns. The goal is
to make it as simple as possible for the public to bring its concerns to the fore. The
techniques include: newsletters, television advertisements, radio messages, billboard
advertisements, public meetings and the Internet. The tool used is less important than the
message. The field o f risk communication is useful in this context.
Specialists in organizing, presenting, and developing the message perform vital
service in placing the problem before the public. The primary way in which
transportation professionals are able to mesh the two objectives is by presenting
alternatives to the public and allowing them to choose the most acceptable alternatives.
In this way, the public guides and shapes the technical program in a way that suits its
interest. The vast majority o f people who do not care about road building issues are left
alone. The people most affected by the program are able to have an effect on the
problem.
The approach taken by transportation plarmers is that the public must be
persuaded that: 1). The problem requires attention and 2). the problem can be addressed
by one o f the alternatives prepared for the public’s consideration by the technicians.

Michael E. Kraft, “Risk Perception and the Politics of Citizen Participation: The Case
o f Radioactive Waste Management.” The Analysis, Communication and Perception o f
Risk ed. by Garrick B.J. and Garrick W.C. (Plenum Press: New York 1991).
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There are cases where these techniques have failed. There is no guarantee that either of
the conditions described above will be met in each case. However, the chances of a
successful transportation program implementation is greatly increased by adopting the
mindset that places the public in a leadership role.
The inability o f risk assessors to make the connection between obtaining public
tolerance and technical models of understanding is the reason neither world of risk will
work as a policy tool. In the case of transportation planning, controversial projects
typically create interest groups hell-bent to stop the project. When the public has been
convinced that the project is necessary and that the affected parties have had a say in
shaping the program, programs become possible. It is neither possible to persuade
everyone nor to equitably provide for all affected parties. However, by ensuring that the
public has not been victimized by high-handed technocrats it sustains the social order and
gives political leaders confidence. One of the primary concerns o f the technocratically
inclined observer is that political leaders do not have the courage to make difficult
decisions. In transportation projects, the opposite is usually true. When the political
leaders can see that the public has been approached without condescension, they often
take tough, difficult positions.
A further aspect o f the process is that it is recursive. Multiple analyses are done
for the same origin and destination. The analysis is repeated for different origins at
different times. This means that new information learned from one analysis can be
applied to others. A flexible process is open to improvement and learning. This process
can cope with changes and new situations better than the process contained in the
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Guidelines which has remained fixed for several years..
Another aspect o f the proposed process is timing. One o f the continual problems
o f waste disposal is how long fuel rods will sit in fuel pools at reactors prior to disposal.
This is called “bum-up credit.”"* The problem is that fuel rods lose radioactivity prior to
final storage. It would be optimal for the program if nuclear power plants could be
decommissioned and the fuel rods shipped at the same time. Those rods still needing
bumup credit could be kept in above ground storage prior to final disposal. A waste
delivery schedule that enabled a plant to be completely cleared o f HLW is preferable to
one in which the same route is used for an extended period.
The shift from results to process is significant because it admits our inability to
“prove” one risk superior to another. One o f the main reasons expert risk assessment has
failed is that it excludes the public from the process o f making decisions. Indeed the
comments of expert risk assessors and bureaucrats who are consumers of risk assessments
actually denigrate the wisdom of making decisions by political leaders instead o f
technical experts.
The shear scale o f the shipping campaign presents problems for the process
described above. Both in terms of time and distance, the challenge of nuclear waste
transportation presents daunting obstacles. The length of the route from the origin to the
destination is one example. Risk will not be evenly distributed and the jurisdictional
boundaries in which risk is allocated will not necessarily conform to the administrative
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boundaries established. The other problem is the problem of time. The time frame in
which the transportation plan is scheduled stretches over 30 years.

A public

involvement process that extends through the thirty year life span o f a shipping campaign
will undoubtedly be costly and frustrating. Without it, however, the project will continue
to alienate citizens living along potential routes and incite controversy.
Fischer’s F ram ew ork Applied to the Proposed Process
The proposed process copes with Fischer’s framework better than either expert or
democratic risk assessment. It does this by incorporating political discussion into the
process o f risk assessment rather than by pretending it does not exist.
1.

Program Verification

At the first level, the proposed process must show that it answers the following
questions differently than the other models o f risk assessment:
a. Does the program empirically fulfill its stated objectives?
b. Does the empirical analysis uncover secondary or unanticipated effects that offset the
program objectives?
c. Does the program fulfill the objectives more effectively than alternative means
available?
The proposed method o f risk assessment will be criticized by technicians who
claim that the suggested process is unimplementable. This is not true. Techniques o f this
sort have been used throughout Europe and the United States in similar situations and
have effectively resolved similar p r o b l e m s . T h e method defines risk (albeit with the

Department o f Energy Draft Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (Summar\ ) DOE Wash. DC August 1995. 22.
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public's assistance), something that neither the Guidelines nor CRA do convincingly.
The proposed process successfully answers the first question.
Public risk assessment has an unanticipated secondary effect in that it will be
more expensive and time consuming to implement. To receive and coordinate
meaningful public input across the wide range o f routes, for the length o f the shipping
campaign, and for the number of jurisdictions will be a huge challenge. Nonetheless, the
expense must be incurred and the processes must be developed to respond to the
challenge. The methods used by the French Government to outwit and the German
Government to repress opposition serve as models for the United States to avoid at all
costs.
The proposed process uses public input to define the variables for consideration in
broad terms; then the correct technicians are used to perform technical analysis. This
serves to defuse insoluble methodological arguments by taking the imanswerable position
that the public wants it that way. Public risk assessment (the proposed process) offers a
better answer to the third question than either the Guidelines or CRA because it cuts
through the webs of methodology.
2.

Situational Validation

At this level, the proposed process must respond to three questions. They are:
a. Is the program relevant to the problem situation?
b. Are there circumstances in the situation that require an exception to be made to the
objectives?
c. Are two or more criteria equally applicable to the situation?
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Using the public in the process o f risk assessment is relevant to the problem
situation. The connection between the public and risk taking behavior comprises the
major part o f the published literature on risk."’ Implementing risk assessment practices
that rely on the public is certainly relevant.
The proposed process would admit exceptional circumstances in the case of route
selection. The mechanics of resolving pleas for exception present a thorny political
problem o f a highly idiosyncratic kind. There should be no exceptions from the
proposed process. B u t the process will contain exceptions based on the discretion
contained within the variables.
Other criteria are certainly relevant to the problem o f selecting routes for
transporting HLW. However, the fundamental measurement when expressed through
public input is irrefutable in a democratic society such as ours. The process requires that
the public be a part of. and aware o f how the criteria were selected and applied. The
result o f the process will necessarily yield fewer criteria than some think advisable,
however, the process o f choosing and applying the criteria are probably more important
than the criteria themselves.
3. Societal Vindication
At this level, the questions that must be answered are:

" ’ See Paul Slovic, “Perception o f Risk,” Science 236, (1987): 280-285; Paul Slovic,
James Flyim, and Robin Gregory “Stigma Happens: Social Problems in the Siting of
Nuclear Waste Facilities,” Risk Analysis 14, (1994): 773-777 and Douglas Easterling and
Howard Kunreuther, The Dilemma o f Siting a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository,
(Boston: Kluwer 1995).
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a. Does the policy have instrumental or contributive value for society as a whole?
b. Does the policy goal result in unanticipated problems with important societal
consequences?
c. Does a commitment to the policy goal lead to consequences that are judged to be
equitably distributed?

Public risk assessment provides more value for society than either the Guidelines
or CRA. It does this by developing policy that requires the public’s active participation
in a meaningful way. Rather than as a mute spectator, the public must add its voice to
selecting hazards that affect it. Society benefits from public risk assessment because
routing decisions are fundamentally made by the people affected by those decisions rather
than by anonymous technocrats. Further, these decisions can be defended based on how
they were made. Policy makers can point to a legitimate process that relies on a
conception o f how our government should work rather than on a model o f technical
understanding that excludes or denigrates the central role of the public.
The policy goal in question here, the comparison and selection o f routes for
transporting HLW is so intimately boimd up with the program o f geological disposal o f
HLW that they are difficult to address separately. The negative consequences caused by
the proposed process come about because that disposal will be facilitated by an improved
process of risk assessment. However, it is my opinion that the greatest potential effect o f
the disposal program (in terms o f health and public safety consequences) will probably
arise out o f transporting HLW, rather than disposing it.
In a case with limited numbers o f route choices available and the need to
designate some route, it is inevitable that some inequities will arise. The proposed
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process fails in that it is not without inequities. However, neither the expert nor the
democratic view avoids inequities. This process attempts to reduce inequities by
implementing a process that is more fair and just than the current available alternatives.
To be fair to the democratic view of risk, it has always known that there is a political
dimension to risk assessment that must be considered."’ This will not persuade die-hard
opponents. What it will do is force them to provide a more legitimate and persuasive
explanation for their view —one that will enable them to win elections and thus change
policy rather than simply remain professional opponents.
4. Social Choice
At the fourth level o f Fischer’s model, the relevant questions he asks are:
a. Do the fundamental ideals (or ideology) that organize the accepted social order provide
a basis for a legitimate resolution o f conflicting value judgments?
b. Do normative reflection and empirical evidence support the justification and adoption
o f an alternative ideology and the social order it prescribes?
The proposed process for risk assessment has the potential (if implemented
correctly) to provide a better basis for resolving conflicts than other alternatives. By
enabling affected parties to have input into route selection and by ensuring their input has
programmatic effects, the proposed process will not resolve conflicts, but it does throw
the process into the political arena where the decision should be made rather than
attempting to hide the process.
At this level, the proposed process creates a method of treating the public with
necessary deference as well as coping with intractable problems of methodology and
146
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inequity. Among the tools used to resolve problems like this is a citizen j u r y . T h e
analogy with the legal system is very appropriate. We use juries to decide life and death
matters of crime and punishment on a routine basis. A citizen's jury or a similar
technique serves to enhance the legitimacy of the policy as well as reconcile the
disaffected.
The proposed process is consistent with Midgley's argument in favor of moral
reasoning. She sees that the exercise of critical judgement is essential to distinguishing
between various cultural practices. She argues that moral reasoning can cut through
cultural differences to make plausible arguments about policy. The proposed process
embraces the standard o f plausibility by incorporating the public affected by route
selection into the process o f selecting the route. This, in turn forces expert risk assessors
to engage the public in a dialogue using language comprehensible to both parties. The
proposed process uses expert risk assessors properly. No longer are they the samurai of
technical enlightenment, rather they are trained technicians whose valuable insights are
harnessed to resolving the task at hand. The proposed process puts a brake on the expert
risk assessor.
The same is true for the democratic risk assessor. The proposed process uses
reasonable techniques to make the affected public a part of the process. By doing so, the
concerns of democratic risk assessors are addressed. No longer will the route selection

14

' Stem, Understanding Risk, 199-206.
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be the arbitrary judgement o f some remote authority. At the same time, democratic risk
assessors are challenged. They must present make a plausible case that their concerns are
justified. The assertions o f the democratic risk assessors cannot be theoretical criticisms
o f the expert view. Instead they must present plausible arguments supporting their
position. By reconciling the two views o f risk, it is possible to make risk assessment a
useful tool for decision makers, experts, and the public.

Summary
In previous chapters this thesis has shown that the competing paradigms used to
assess the risk o f transporting HLW are ineffective. They are vulnerable to criticism on a
basis that cannot be refuted using expert judgm ent and technical analysis. This chapter
proposed an assessment strategy that incorporates the public into an open process for risk
assessment. Attending to public concerns promotes legitimacy of the policy by
demonstrating to the public that their concerns are receiving consideration.. Neither of
the proposed worlds o f risk assessment achieves this. The expert technique fails because
it relies on arbitrary expert judgment that is always open to question. The democratic
technique has not developed into a reliable process. Yet it suffers from the same
problems as the expert technique in that it relies on the same assumptions and
methodologies that fatally handicap expert risk assessment. The proposed process uses
the public as a crucial component o f the risk assessment process and admits that there
will be political issues that must be dealt with that are inherent to any risk analysis.
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How we make decisions about technology is fundamental to the nation’s future.
To attempt to remove public concerns and judgments about technology (as advocates of
expert risk assessment would argue is irresponsible and dangerous). However, to deny
that we must accept risk is to retreat away from the many benefits o f technology and to
stifle the nation’s future. Technology is often portrayed as the demon. In the case of
nuclear power, the problem is more complex. Opposition to nuclear power has largely
gained provenance not because o f the dangers o f radioactivity but because o f the failure
o f managers to make good decisions about technology.
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CHAPTERS

CONCLUSION

In the modern world, the most dangerous form o f determinism is the technological
phenomenon. It is not a question ofgetting rid o f it, but by an act offreedom, o f
transcending it.
This study argues that the central controversy in risk assessment has more to do
with political legitimacy than it does with either the technical methodology o f the
physical or social sciences. Legitimacy is a necessary ingredient in the route selection
process for comparing the routes used to transport high level radioactive waste.
This study has shown that the two prevailing schools of thought on risk
assessment fail to create a legitimate basis on which to make public policy. The
competing schools are different mainly in the way they define risk. The expert risk
assessment school defines risk in a way that excludes human values and their potential
responses to a hazard. The democratic school defines risk in a manner that is so broad
that no risk assessment can hope to be implemented.
Fundamentally the two worlds o f risk assessment share a common characteristic.
They both exclude the political content o f any route comparison. As a result, neither
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school o f though is a useful public policy tool because the needs o f legitimacy are not
met. This was shown by evaluating each o f the two worlds of risk assessment using
F ischers framework for policy analysis.
Fischer's framework is extremely useful in this context because it shows how
different sides o f the risk controversy argue from different levels o f his framework. The
two sides are arguing aroimd each other rather than addressing the issues that are o f
fundamental importance if risk assessment is to be a successful tool.
Expert risk assessment is incapable of “proving” one route is safer than another.
Democratic risk assessment as articulated in CRA has no mechanism that can show one
assessment to be more soimd than another. Each individual risk assessment is as good as
any other. Because o f this, risk assessment has consistently failed to deliver on its
promise o f informing the public and policymakers as to optimal strategies to cope with
uncertain programs.
This study defined a new method of making policy in the face o f this kind o f
uncertainty. This process relies on public input as a critical component o f the decision
making process. The example of transportation planning is instructive for risk assessment
because planners were faced with the challenge of reconciling technical and political
understanding. After decades o f struggle, the transportation planning field has responded
by institutionalizing public involvement and developing sophisticated techniques for
obtaining public input.
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The importance o f this input is less because o f its technical merit than because o f
its merit as a means to create legitimacy. The public demands to know that their concerns
are foremost in the minds o f decision makers. Mistakes made by risk assessors in the
past have been to equate private with public risk and voluntary risk with involuntary risk.
Fischer’s framework suggests that policy about risk must meet different benchmarks
when it applies to public risks and when risk is willingly accepted by individuals rather
than imposed on groups.
In order for risk policy to be successful a context must be established for the
affected parties. This context must possess several characteristics. These characteristics
are:
1) There must be clear lines o f authority within the organization implementing
the risky policy. Typically no single agency has authority for overseeing all o f the
dimensions o f the hazard. This is a major weakness in the DOE’s program and should be
corrected prior to any shipping campaign.. We suggest a special task force to manage a
routing decision should be considered by DOE.
2)

The full implications of the risky project should be considered. In this case,

for example, compensation for affected parties should be defined prior to beginning the
shipping. Additional complications arise when even simple questions are asked: who is
affected by the program? In what way are they affected? How can those effects be
compensated or mitigated? None of these questions can be answered in the current
context o f nuclear waste transportation. The recognition of these potential complications
is just now becoming clear to the DOE and its supporters. None o f the fundamental
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questions about the transportation portion o f the program have been answered (or
scarcely even asked).
3)

The program must be malleable. The public must also be able to see its

influence on the DOE’s program. This does not mean a foolish decision should be made
in order to appease public opinion. Instead it means that the public must see that their are
concerns incorporated in meaningful ways. The DOE cannot afford to use “Decide,
Annoimce, Defend” as their leitmotif. A way to enhance malleability is to adopt a
gradual programmatic implementations strategy. Gradual programs that enable
calibration o f assessments will also enable the public to have greater confidence in the
larger program. These will have enormous advantage to the larger program.
The challenge posed by the transportation o f High Level Waste is a serious one by
itself. Seen in the broader context of a technological society, the problems o f risk
assessment are important. The problem of nuclear fuel disposal is real and cannot be
dismissed. Something must be done with it. Fuel rods must either be transported to a
storage facility or left where they are. But something must be done. The same thing will
prove to be true for other evolving technologies. There is a consensus growing among
scientists and technicians that a backlash against science is currently in full swing. The
fear expressed by Carl Sagan is that we will return to a “demon-haunted world” in which
technology and science are viewed as evil.''*’
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This diagnosis misses the point. The story of technological failure reveals less
about technology than it does about the wise management of technology. The Bhopal,
India disaster would not have occurred had it not been assumed that the a plant designed
in Texas could be duplicated in its entirety in I n d i a . T h e management o f technology is
the most pressing problem facing industrialized nations. As technology becomes more
difficult for laymen to comprehend and as the pace of change increases, it is not likely
technology will cease to be developed. It is more likely that institutional and political
arrangements must evolve that can successfully cope with these changes. The application
of technology is not an ethically neutral endeavor. The dream of the expert risk assessors
was that it would be.
Risk assessment was proposed as the best way to reconcile the public to the
problem o f dangerous technologies and programs. This dream may yet prove possible,
but only if reforms to the practice of risk assessment are imdertaken. The case o f
choosing routes for high level waste transportation points the way.
The existing procedures leave numerous methodological questions imanswered.
These unanswered questions will cause methodological argument when route selection
begins and the Guidelines are actually implemented. The Guidelines are also a part of a
very' incomplete policy architecture. The inability to answer basic questions about the
potential impacts o f the program means that there will be confusion about how the
program is ultimately implemented.
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Once more, the specter o f horribly mismanaged technology comes into view. The
fuel rods themselves will not be the culprit in causing an accident. In expert terms they
are simply the "hazard."'^' Instead harm will be done because people have failed to wisely
manage dangerous technology. The key challenge for democratic societies is how to
manage the technology so that the process o f technological management conforms to our
collective aspirations o f what our society should be. It is up to risk assessors to develop
methods that enable them to find out what those aspirations are and build systems that
can are consistent with those goals.
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APPENDIX: RO U TE ANALYSIS W O RK SH EETS
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Default Route Worksheet
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Routine Exposure C riteria
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42.365

.000016

.000677

14700189.72

274625

53.528

.000016

.000856

412003.51

3940624.92

274625

14.349

.000018

.000258

3

6328369.14

11173189.91

166375

67.156

.000018

.000258

4

153076.53

30674558.44

166375

184.36

.000016

.00107

5

18206222.27

64800862.82

166375

389.48

.0000086

.00239

9

18206222.27

16203537.82

166375

97.39

.000015

.0014

10

18206222.27

17113747.93

166375

102.86

.000015

.00154

11

47417569.84

26553839.11

166375

159.60

.000013

.00207

12

47417569.84

34140650.28

166375

205.20

.000013

.00266

13

37694483.51

22239745.27

166375

133.67

.000015

.0020

14

37765633.89

28791881.76

166375

172.51

.000013

.00224

15

28446666.71

18490333.36

166375

111.13

.000015

.00166

16

28446666.71

23895200.04

166375

143.62

.000015

.00215

17

28446666.71

30153466.71

166375

181.23

.000013

.00235

18

28446666.71

30722400.05

166375

184.65

.000013

.0024

19

12375737.67

18643249.61

166375

112.05

.000015

.00168

20

12375737.67

21627952.42

64000

337.93

.00001

.00337

21

12375737.67

41595961.37

64000

649.93

.0000006

.00037

22

7240584.02

28887708.94

64000

451.37

.0000005

.00022

23

7240584.02

59811278.15

125000

478.49

.00000078

.000037

23

1499694.34

6780450.25

274625

24.68

.000018

.00044

23

198396.00

897383.67

274625

3.26

000018

5.881

23

121046.00

3055725.80

274625

11.12

.000018

.00020
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Dose to People a t T ru ck Stops

Routine E xposure C rite ria

Seg.
No.
I

.409

Seg.
No.
1

.430

I

.509

1

.536

2

.147

2

.154

3

.032

3

.0054

4

.036

4

.069

5

.064

5

111

9

.016

9

.090

10

.017

10

.345

11

.010

11

1.232

12

.013

12

.195

13

.010

13

.679

14

.013

14

.385

15

.011

15

.350

16

.015

16

.268

17

.019

17

.399

18

.019

18

.443

19

.027

19

.180

20

.043

20

.092

21

.084

21

.130

22

.099

22

.135

23

.165

23

.215

23

.069

23

.081

23

.069

23

.075

23

.388

23

.040

L/v

D1+D2+D3+D4
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D efault Route Economic Consequences
Seg
No.

Length

Economic
Sum/Length

Accident Rate
/Million Miles

Consequences
* Frequency

1

26.61

9.028

.00000001

9.028E08

Economic
Consequences
Factor
9.02E08

1

33.12

7.25

.00000001

7.25E08

7.25E08

2

9.56

25.11

.00000001

2.5E07

2.51E07

3

1.77

136.06

.00000001

1.36E06

1.36E06

4

2.00

119.88

.00000002

2.39E06

2.39E06

5

3.56

67.49

.00000005

3.37E06

3.37E06

9

.89

269.923

.000000011

2.96E05

2.96E05

10

.94

255.56

.00000001

255E05

2.55E05

11

.56

428.98

.00000001

4.28E05

4.28E05

12

.72

333.65

.00000012

4.00E05

4.00E05

13

.59

407.17

.00000004

1.62E05

I.62E05

14

.76

316.09

.00000003

9.48E06

9.48E06

15

.65

369.58

.00000002

7.39E06

7.39E06

16

.84

285.99

.000000025

7.14E06

7.14E06

17

1.06

226.63

.00000001

2.26E06

9.48E06

18

1.08

222.43

.00000001

2.22E06

7.31E06

19

1.51

159.47

.00000001

1.59E06

2.26E06

20

1.75

137.46

.00000001

1.37E06

2.22E06

21

3.36

71.47

.00000001

7.14E07

1.59E06

22

3.99

60.21

.00000001

6.02E07

1.36E06

23

8.26

20.08

.00000001

2.98E07

7.I4E07

23

4.52

53.13

.00000001

5.31E07

6.02E07

23

4.52

53.11

.00000001

5.33E07

2.98E07

23

25.24

9.51

.00000001

9.51E08

5.13E07
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Route A Worksheet
•Avg.
Pop.
Density
16.09

Hourly
Traf
Count
1377.5

Veh. Sep.

Veh Sep.
Constant

65

Dist between
opposing
lanes Constant
.00011

10.38

.0000018

5.94

55

.00011

1295.5

1364.16

8.86

.0000018

SRI 60

3.91

40

.00025

377.80

218.75

40.22

.000008

4

SRI 60

2.24

45

.00025

1572.5

514.58

19.23

.000008

5

SRI 60

26.12

45

.00025

9.059

514.58

19.23

.000008

5

SRI 60

13.99

45

.00025

13.11

514.58

19.23

.000008

Seg.
No.

Seg.
Desc.

Length

Speed

I

I 15

27.64

2

1 15

3

R o u tin e Exposure C riteria
D1 Dose to Persons along R o u te

D2 Dose to Passengers in o th e r
Vehicles

Segmen

P *l/v

Cl

D1

L*t

V2

L*t/v2

D2

1

6.84

.0000068

4.66E04

38077.17

4225

9.01

.00099

2

140.01

.0000068

9.52E03

8108.18

3025

2.68

.00029

3

36.94

.0000068

2.5E03

855.61

1600

.53

.00013

4

78.32

.0000068

5.33E03

1153.29

2025

.56

.00014

5

5.27

.0000068

3.59E04

13481.44

2025

6.65

.0016

5

4.078

.0000068

2.77E04

7200.45

2025

3.55

.00088

t
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D 3 Dose to T ruck C rew

Dose to People at
T ruck Stops

Segment

t*t

l’^t2

V3

(I*t2)/v3

D3

L/v

1

189750

52451307

274625

190.99

.003

.002

6.25

.09

186095

11060916

0.69

.85

47851.

187165.2

2

3

43
166375

66.48

.000

.004

11
64000

2.92

.000

.0017

23
4

5

5

264796

593463.9

.0

3

264796

6937326.

.0

19

264796

3705232.

.0

36

Routine Exposure C riteria
Segment
1
2
3
4
5
5

91125

6.51

.005

.004

2
91125

76.12

.006

.05

0
91125

40.66

.000
3

D1+D2+D3+D4
2.50E02
I.54E02
2.08E02
1.50E02
5.90E02
2.87E02
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Route B Worksheet
Avg.
Pop.
Density
.339

Hourly
Traf
Count
30.83

Veh. Sep.

Veh Sep.
Constant

45

Dist between
opposing
lanes Constant
.00049

321.08

.000001

19.23

50

.00049

.56

230.65

47.69

.0000008

115

27.64

65

.00011

16.09

1377.5

10.38

.0000018

3

1 15

5.94

55

.00011

1295.5

1364.16

8.86

.0000018

4

SRI 60

3.91

40

.00025

377.80

218.75

40.22

.000008

5

SRI 60

2.24

45

.00025

1572.5

514.58

19.23

.000008

6

SRI 60

26.12

45

.00025

9.059

514.58

19.23

.000008

6

SRI 60

13.99

45

.00025

13.11

514.58

19.23

.000008

Seg.
No.

Seg.
Desc.

Length

Speed

1

SR164

18.64

1

US95

2

R o u tin e Exposure C riteria
D1 D ose to Persons along R o u te

D2 Dose to Passengers in o th er
Vehicles

P*l/v

Cl

Dl

1

.14

.0000068

9.56E06

1

.21

.0000068

2

6.84

3

Segmen

V2

L*t/v2

D2

574.93

2025

.283

.00018

1.48E05

4436.56

2500

1.77

.000008

.0000068

4.66E04

38077.17

4225

9.01

.00099

140.01

.0000068

9.52E03

8108.18

3025

2.68

.00029

4

36.94

.0000068

2.5E03

855.61

1600

.53

.00013

5

78.32

.0000068

5.33E03

1153.29

2025

.56

.00014

6

5.27

.0000068

3.59E04

13481.44

2025

6.65

.0016

6

4.078

.0000068

2.77E04

7200.45

2025

3.55

.00088

t
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Dose to People at Truck

D3 D ose to T ruck Crew

Stops
Segment

Mt2

V3

(I*t2)/v3

D3

L /v

189750

52451307

274625

190.99

.00343

.002

6.25

.09

186095

11060916

166375

66.48

.00011

.004

0.69

.85

3

47851.

187165.2

64000

2.92

.00023

.0017

4

264796

593463.9

91125

6.51

.0052

.004

.0

3

264796

6937326.

91125

76.12

.0060

.05

.0

19

264796

3705232.

91125

40.66

.0003

.02

.0

36

I

2

5

5

R outine Exposure C riteria
Segment
I
2
3
4
5
5

D1+D2+D3+D4
2.50EG2
I.54E02
2.08E02
1.50E02
5.90E02
2.87E02
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